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THE FACELESS COURT 
 





This Article is the first to examine the behavior of judges and 
their law clerks (officially entitled référendaires) at the Court of 
Justice of the European Union.  It identifies a number of serious is-
sues affecting Court performance.  First, the Article finds that the 
Court's high judicial salaries and lack of procedural safeguards for 
EU judicial appointments attract political appointees.  As a conse-
quence, some judges who are selected are not competent to per-
form their duties and are dominated by their référendaires.  More-
over, the high turnover rate of EU judges hampers their 
productivity and increases their dependence on the référendaires.  
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Ibanez-Colomo, Rosa Greaves, Oana Stefan, Christopher Townley, Eleanor Fox, 
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Using a sample of data hand-collected from LinkedIn, the Article 
demonstrates that référendaires are drawn from a relatively closed 
social network.  There is no open platform for recruiting référen-
daires, and the requirement of French as the working language 
significantly limits the pool of eligible candidates.  The inefficiency 
of the référendaire labor market results in less competition, leading 
many référendaires to stay longer at the Court.  The revolving door 
between the Court and the European Commission raises serious 
conflict issues, as the Commission is able to exert influence on the 
Court from the inside and gain a comparative advantage in litiga-
tion.  In addition, the Court’s practice of issuing a single, collegial 
decision encourages free-riding, increases pressures for judges and 
référendaires to conform, and suppresses dissent, as illustrated in 
the Microsoft case.  Last but not least, the division of labor between 
the General Court and the Court of Justice could lead to divergent 
incentives for judges working at different levels of the Court. 
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 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (“the Court”)1 is 
the most powerful supranational court in the world.  In the politi-
cal science literature the Court is often depicted as activist, con-
stantly expanding the scope of EU law and pushing its bounda-
ries.2  Indeed, through a series of innovative decisions in the 1960s, 
the Court is said to have effectively “constitutionalized” Europe.3  
Today the Court’s power and influence have extended far beyond 
its founders’ original goal of unifying Europe.  As regulations orig-
inating from Brussels have penetrated many aspects of economic 
life,4 the Court not only delineates the fundamental rights of Euro-
pean citizens but also greatly influences the way multinational 
companies are conducting business within and outside of Europe.  
Acting as a veritable “Supreme Court” of Europe, the Court has the 
authority to provide the ultimate interpretation of EU regulations 
in a wide range of areas affecting global commence.  Multinational 
companies, ranging from European leaders like GlaxoSmithKline 
and LVMH, to America’s iconic businesses such as Google and Fa-
cebook, and to China’s national champions such as Huawei and 
ZTE, all need to pay heed to the Court’s rulings.   
 
Despite this considerable global profile, we know very little 
about the Court itself.  Indeed, existing literature on EU law tends 
                                                     
1 The Court of Justice of the European Union comprises three tribunals:  The 
Court of Justice, the General Court, and the Civil Service Tribunal.  For purpose of 
this article, the Court refers to the Court of Justice and the General Court. 
2 See generally e.g., KAREN ALTER, THE EUROPEAN COURT’S POLITICAL POWER 
(2009) (analyzing the political influence of the Court); JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AT THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE (Mark Dawson et al. eds., 2013) (discussing the 
Court’s political role); HJALTE RASMUSSEN, ON LAW AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF JUSTICE (1986) (explaining the Court’s role in judicial pro-community 
policymaking in Europe). 
3 See e.g., Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges and the Making of A Transnational Constitu-
tion, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 24–27 (1981) (demonstrating the effect of the Court of Jus-
tice on the European Community’s legal framework); Joseph H.H. Weiler, The 
Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2413–22 (1991) (discussing the trans-
formation which occurred in the European Community’s relationship with the 
individual Member States between 1958 and 1992).  
4 See generally Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effects, 107 NW. U. L. J. 1 (2012) (dis-
cussing the increasingly expansive role of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities in the European judicial process). 
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to view the Court as a black box and ignores one crucial element in 
judicial law making—human behavior.  This partly has to do with 
the “faceless” nature of EU judicial law making.  Since its estab-
lishment, the Court has followed the French tradition of issuing a 
single, collective, and unanimous judgment without dissents.  In 
fact, judges are prohibited from revealing how the Court reached 
its decision in a particular case.5  Another daunting challenge in 
understanding the Court is the secrecy of the decision-makers 
themselves.  While judges’ profiles are disclosed by the Court, the 
Court does not publish any information on their law clerks (offi-
cially entitled “référendaires”6).  But référendaires play an im-
portant and indeed sometimes crucial role in the decision-making 
process.   
 
Despite these challenges, this Article hopes to draw a sketch of 
the faces behind the Court.  The project is inherently interdiscipli-
nary and builds upon various strands of literature in law, econom-
ics, political science, and sociology.  It is also both quantitative and 
qualitative.  Based on the public information disclosed by the 
Court, I provide summary statistics of the background of the judg-
es and advocates general (collectively referred to as “EU judges” 
hereinafter) appointed by the Court since 1952.  As the background 
of référendaires is not disclosed, I hand-collected data from 
LinkedIn, a professional social networking website, and created a 
dataset of 103 former référendaires and seventy-four current réfé-
rendaires working for the Court.  In May 2014, I made a field trip 
to Luxembourg, and during the subsequent twelve months I con-
ducted twenty extensive interviews with former and current mem-
bers and staff of the Court.7  
 
The Article is organized as follows:  Section II sets the stage by 
providing a sketch of the EU judicial process.  Section III delves in-
                                                     
5 See The Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, art. 2, Aug, 
11, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 201, 210 (directing each Judge to “preserve the secrecy 
of the deliberations of the Court”). 
6 Référendaires are also referred to as “legal secretaries” in English.  
7 The interviews were open-ended and conducted either face to face or over 
the phone and lasted for about an hour on average.  They were conducted on 
condition of anonymity, and thus, interviewee’s names have been omitted from 
this article.  
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to the appointment process of EU judges and analyzes how the sal-
ary of EU judges could, in turn, influence their judicial quality.  
Section IV studies the hidden decision-makers at the Court by ex-
amining the labour market, social network, country of origin, and 
career structure of référendaires.  It also probes into the affiliation 
of some référendaires with the European Commission (“the Com-
mission”) and explores the potential consequences.  Section V ana-
lyzes how the Court’s practice of issuing a single judgment could 
suppress dissent, as illustrated in the Microsoft case.  Section VI 
studies the unique division of labor between different levels of the 
Court and analyzes how such an arrangement could influence the 
incentive structure for the EU judges.  Section VII concludes and 
provides implications of this study.  The summary statistics of the 
EU judges and référendaires are presented in Section VIII.  
 
2.  HOW THE COURT WORKS 
 
The Court is comprised of three tribunals:  The Court of Justice, 
the General Court, and the Civil Service Tribunal.8  Both the Court 
of Justice and the General Court are composed of one judge from 
each EU country.9  The Civil Service Tribunal comprises seven 
judges.10  As the Civil Service Tribunal specializes in staff cases, it 
is excluded for the purpose of this study.  As of July 2015, there 
were also nine advocates general at the Court of Justice, six of 
whom are appointed from the largest EU Member States (including 
Germany, France, Spain, Poland, the UK, and Italy).11  The final 
                                                     
8 Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union, art. 19 (1), Oct. 
26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 27.  
9 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, art. 253–54, Oct. 12, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 159 [hereinafter TFEU] (noting 
the criteria by which judges of the General Court and Court of Justice are select-
ed).     
10 HUGO BRADY, TWELVE THINGS EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 32(2014), 
http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/
attachments/pdf/2014/hugo_brady_12_things_ecj_22.07.14-9313.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z2UA-SZYJ].   
11 See Press Release No 139/13, Court of Justice of the European Union, Entry 
into Office of New Members at the Court of Justice and the General Court (Oct. 23, 2013),  
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2013-
10/cp130139en.pdf  [https://perma.cc/B7EL-L8XJ] (noting changes in the com-
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three positions rotate among the remaining EU countries.12  Similar 
to judges, advocates general are also officially “members” of the 
Court and indeed enjoy status equal to judges.13  However, they do 
not participate in the deliberation of cases.14  Rather, they provide 
an independent reasoned opinion to the Court, thus playing the 
role of a quasi-decision-maker.   
 
At each level of the Court, every judge or advocate general is 
entitled to three clerks (officially entitled référendaires); some 
judges who assume management responsibilities are entitled to 
four référendaires.15  Judges at the Court of Justice have additional 
help from administrateurs juristes, who are lawyers but do not 
work on cases directly.16  According to the data provided by the 
Court in March 2015, there were 123 référendaires and 22 adminis-
trateurs juristes working at the Court of Justice and 94 référen-
daires at the General Court.17   
 
The Court of Justice is the highest court for the European Un-
ion, but it also acts as the Court of first instance for certain matters.  
Its work falls within two main categories.  The first category in-
volves direct actions against Member States or EU institutions as 
well as appeals from the General Court.18  The second category in-
cludes preliminary rulings, which are proceedings in which the 
Court gives clarification to a national court when the latter is in 
                                                                                                                        
position of advocates general and that the court would appoint two additional 
advocates by Oct. 2015).  
12 Id.  
13 See Court of Justice of the Eur. Union, Annual Report 2014, 67–89 (2015) 
(showing that judges and advocates general are both members of the court, and 
they enjoy the same status). 
14 TFEU, supra note 9, at art. 252. 
15 This is based on the Author’s search of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union in the official directory of the European Union.  EU Whoiswho, EUROPA, 
http://europa.eu/whoiswho/public/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/6EK3-HD67].  
16 E-mail from Access to Documents Unit, Court of Justice of the European 
Union to Author (Mar. 20, 2015, 15:30 GMT) (on file with Author) (providing data 
about the référendaires and administrateur jurists). 
17 Id. 
18 David Edward, How the Court of Justice Works, 20 EUR. L. REV. 539, 543 
(1995). 
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doubt about the interpretation or validity of an EU law.19  The 
work of the Court of Justice encompasses all areas of EU law, such 
as constitutional cases involving free movement, fundamental 
rights, tax, environment, intellectual property, competition, state 
aid, and social policy.  The General Court is the lower level of the 
Court.  It hears actions against EU institutions, though certain mat-
ters are reserved to the Court of Justice.  It mainly deals with fact-
intensive cases involving competition, state aid, trade, agriculture, 
and trademarks.  Cases heard at the first instance by the General 
Court may be subject to appeal to the Court of Justice on points of 
law only.   
 
EU judicial law-making is a cooperative enterprise and judges 
work together in a committee.  At the Court of Justice there are ten 
chambers, each consisting of three to five judges.20  At the General 
Court there are nine chambers, each consisting of three judges.21  
Certain types of important cases are reviewed by the grand cham-
ber, which is comprised of the President, the Vice President, the 
Presidents of Chambers, and a number of other judges.22  Extreme-
ly important cases are decided by a plenary session of the whole 
court.23  The composition of the chambers changes periodically, 
and the presidency of the chambers rotates on an annual basis.24 
 
At the Court of Justice, the President allocates a case to one 
judge as rapporteur and the First Advocate-General25 allocates it to 
one advocate general (though advocates general are no longer ap-
pointed in every case due to a workload concern).  The rapporteur 
                                                     
19 Id. at 544–45. 
20 See Court of Justice of the Eur. Union, supra note 13, at 85–86 (listing the 
presidents of each of the ten chambers at the Court of Justice and the order of 
precedence for the judges overall).  
21 See id. at 175 (listing the president of each of the nine chambers at the Gen-
eral Court and the order of precedence for the judges overall).  
22 Court of Justice of the Eur. Union, Consolidated Version of the Rules of 
Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Union [hereinafter Rules of Pro-
cedure], art. 27(1) (Sept. 25, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/
docs/application/pdf/2012-10/rp_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6A7-YRNJ]. 
23 Id. at art. 60(2).  
24 Edward, supra note 18, at 542–43. 
25 The First Advocate-General assumes a management role in deciding 
whether to review certain appeals from the General Court and to allocate cases 
among advocates general.   
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assumes the responsibility of drafting the report of the hearing, 
which is essentially a summary of the parties’ arguments, and a 
preliminary report, which is purely an internal document for pur-
poses of deliberation.26  The preliminary report summarizes the le-
gal and factual background of the case and concludes with the per-
sonal observations and recommendations of the rapporteur judge.  
The advocate general does not participate in the deliberation of the 
case, and will issue his own independent opinion.27  Once the ad-
vocate general has delivered the opinion, the rapporteur then cir-
culates a note to the other judges in the panel providing his sugges-
tions on how the case should be handled.28   
 
The deliberation among judges takes place behind closed doors 
and référendaires are not allowed to participate in the process.29  
Even if there is disagreement among the judges, the Court only is-
sues one single judgment and no dissenting opinions are allowed.30  
In reality the rapporteur and the advocate general will be most 
closely involved in the case as they assume most of the drafting re-
sponsibilities.  They also gain the first mover advantage in influ-
encing other judges on the panel in how to decide the case.  The 
General Court largely follows a similar process, except that it has 
no dedicated member serving as advocate general, and advocates 
general are instead appointed on an ad hoc basis from among the 
judges. 
 
As the EU’s main executive arm, the Commission is the most 
frequent party appearing in front of the Court.  Since the Court’s 
establishment, the Commission has served as a party in over 52% 
of the cases.31  While Member States have primary responsibility 
for applying EU law, the Commission monitors its application and 
                                                     
26 Edward, supra note 18, at 551–52. 
27 Id. at 555.  
28 Id. 
29 Rules of Procedure, supra note 22, at art. 32.  
30 Edward, supra note 18, at 555–57.  
31 This data was hand-collected using the Court’s database and includes all 
cases decided by the Court from its establishment to August 27, 2015.  InfoCuria, 
Case-law of the Court of Justice, CURIA, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
recherche.jsf?language=en [https://perma.cc/WA2D-2ERA] (last visited Aug. 27, 
2015).  
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may bring infringement actions against Member States for non-
compliance.  With regard to competition cases, the Commission 
acts as both the investigator and prosecutor and can bring actions 
directly against individuals and companies.   
 
3.  EU JUDGES 
 
Judges are, as Posner called them, “all-too-human workers.”32  
And like other humans, judges derive their utility from maximiz-
ing the sources of their satisfaction; these include not only income 
but also non-pecuniary compensation, such as prestige, power, and 
leisure.  However, unlike labor participants working for private 
organizations, the performance of judges is largely insulated from 
performance review.  To be sure, judicial opinions are often subject 
to criticisms, but the nature of judicial rulings will always create 
winners and losers.  As long as a judge does not commit gross mis-
takes and faithfully applies the statutes, a judge’s career will nor-
mally be secure no matter what interpretation he applies to the 
statute.  Indeed, the loosely-worded EU treaties provide plenty of 
room for EU judges to make law.  The unobservability of judicial 
output could therefore lead to problems of adverse selection and 
moral hazard.  This, however, does not mean that EU judges are 
free from any constraints.  The selection process for EU judges, as 
well as the incentives and constraints imposed by the structure and 
rules of their careers, has a significant impact on how they behave. 
 
As of the end of 2015, 184 men and women have served at the 
Court of Justice and the General Court.  Ninety-five have served as 
judges.  Forty-five have served as advocates general at the Court of 
Justice, and sixty-six have served as judges at the General Court. 
Twenty-two judges have served multiple roles at the Court.  A sta-
tistical summary of the judges’ gender, education, and professional 
experience is presented in Appendix I.   
 
                                                     
32 RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 7 (2008).  
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3.1.  Selection  
 
As the performance of EU judges cannot be easily observed 
and monitored, judicial appointment becomes of paramount im-
portance in controlling judicial quality.33  However, judicial ap-
pointments are not made strictly on merit.  While the EU prides it-
self on integration, there is no common market for judges.  Like 
many other international tribunals, candidates for judicial posi-
tions at the Court are put forward by the individual Member 
States.34  Upon nomination, governments of the Member States, by 
common accord, appoint the judge for a renewable term of six 
years.35  In practice, Member States never disagree with each oth-
er’s nomination, so in effect each Member State appoints its own 
judges.36  As a consequence, each Member State follows its own ju-
dicial appointment process, which is often opaque and political.37   
 
As shown in Appendix I, more than 65% of the EU judges have 
worked in government prior to joining the Court.  In particular, 
28% of the EU judges’ primary work experience and 27% of the EU 
judges’ last positions before joining the Court were in government.  
Noticeably, more judges at the Court of Justice (67%) have back-
grounds in government than those at the General Court (57%).  
Many of them have been former ministers or legal advisors at the 
                                                     
33 See Damian Chalmers, Judicial Performance, Membership, and Design at the 
Court of Justice, in SELECTING EUROPE’S JUDGES: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE 
APPOINTMENTS TO THE EUROPEAN COURT 51, 55 (Michal Bobek ed., 2015) (arguing 
that the lack of clear vision in the function and direction of the Court during the 
judicial appointment stage results in the Court setting its own tasks for itself, 
causing the judicial outcome to reflect the prevailing professional disposition of 
the Court). 
34 See Sally J. Kenney, Breaking the Silence: Gender Mainstreaming and the Com-
position of the European Court of Justice, 10 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 257, 259–60 (2002) 
(describing the general method by which judges are appointed). 
35 TFEU, supra note 9, at art. 253.  
36 See Kenney, supra note 34 (noting that appointments are rarely a subject of 
attention and states simply need to inform the council of their decision). 
37 See id. at 260 (2002) (explaining the secrecy surrounding Court appoint-
ments).  See also Henri de Waele, Not Quite the Bed Procrustes Built, in SELECTING 
EUROPE’S JUDGES: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE APPOINTMENTS TO THE EUROPEAN 
COURT, supra note 33, at 24 (analyzing the system for selecting judges at the Court 
of Justice of the European Union).  
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Ministry of Justice or former members of the diplomatic corps.  
Some have even served in the parliaments of the nominating state.  
The preference for government officials is not surprising.  As the 
secret deliberation rule prevents nominating states from monitor-
ing the voting preference of their appointees, appointing govern-
ments are more prudent in choosing the candidates that they be-
lieve will act in their interests.  Only 53% have prior judicial 
experience in the national courts.  In fact, only 17% of the EU judg-
es’ primary work experience and 29% of the EU judges’ last posi-
tions before joining the Court were in the judiciary.  But sovereign 
interest is not the whole story.  Kenney observes that each nomi-
nating country would need to strike their own balance of interests 
in terms of political parties and languages when selecting the 
“best” candidates to the Court and other supranational tribunals.38  
Even if appointments are not driven by a specific policy agenda, 
personal connections to the appointing executive and party creden-
tials are deemed paramount in some Member States.39  In some 
cases, the nominating state has used judicial appointment as a form 
of patronage to reward loyal functionaries or as an opportunity to 
remove an undesirable political opponent. 40 
 
Worse yet, there is no public hearing during the appointment 
process.  The only public information the Court makes available 
about the judges are their profiles.  These profiles generally contain 
a judge's birth year, year of entry and departure, position at the 
Court, prior education background, work experience, and other 
public activities.  However, a closer look at these profiles reveals 
that there is no mandatory disclosure rule, and many of the pro-
files are incomplete.  Indeed, Appendix I reveals that almost 77% of 
the profiles of the EU judges contain missing information about 
their education background, so it is not possible to verify either 
schools attended, degrees obtained, or both.  16% of profiles do not 
contain sufficient information about work experience, so it is not 
possible to verify their primary work experience prior to joining 
                                                     
38 Kenney, supra note 34.  
39 Id. 
40 Id.  In this regard, the Court of Justice is not so different from other interna-
tional tribunals.  See generally Erik Voeten, The Politics of International Judicial Ap-
pointments, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 387 (2008) (discussing the influence that governments 
exert over the decisions of international judges through the appointment process). 
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the bench.  Nor do we know the last positions of almost 18% of 
judges based on their public profiles.  In fact, 26% of EU judges 
provide no information regarding their educational background 
whatsoever.  Over 40% of judges from Portugal, Spain, Greece, 
Denmark, and the Netherlands completely omit their educational 
background.  An extreme example is Denmark, where five out of 
seven appointees provide no disclosure of educational back-
ground.  This coincides with the fact that most judges appointed 
from Denmark come from the government.  
 
Even when the profiles are complete, the information on paper 
is still far from enough to gauge the judge’s qualifications for the 
position. To function effectively and efficiently at the Court, EU 
judges need to possess three important skills:  first, knowledge of 
EU Law; second, superb legal and research skills and an astute le-
gal mind; and third, fluency in the French language.41  However, 
the criteria as established in the EU Treaty are very loose.42  This 
leaves considerable room for discretion.   
 
In 2010, an expert committee (“the Committee”) was estab-
lished under Article 255 of the Treaty on the functioning of the Eu-
ropean Union (TFEU) to vet the credentials of candidates nominat-
ed by the member states as well as current members who are up 
for reappointment.43  The Committee is comprised of seven mem-
bers, who are chosen from former EU judges as well as members of 
national supreme courts and lawyers of recognized competence.44  
                                                     
41 See Kenney, supra note 34, at 267 (noting the threshold for merit for EU 
judges).  See also Iyiola Solanke, Diversity and Independence in the European Court of 
Justice, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 89, 105 (2008) (addressing the need for improved di-
versity, independence, and additional transparency in the Court of Justice).  
42 Art. 253 of the TFEU provides that “the Judges and Advocates-General of 
the Court of Justice shall be chosen from persons whose independence is beyond 
doubt and who possess the qualifications required for appointment to the highest 
judicial offices in their respective countries or who are jurisconsults of recognised 
competence.”  TFEU supra note 9, at art. 253.  Art. 254 of the TFEU provides that 
“the members of the General Court shall be chosen from persons whose inde-
pendence is beyond doubt and who possess the ability required for appointment 
to high judicial office.”  Id. at art. 254. 
43 Tomáš Dumbrovský et al., Judicial Appointments: The Article 255 TFEU Advi-
sory Panel and Selection Procedures in the Member States, 51 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 
455, 459 (2014). 
44 Council Decision 2010/125/EU, Appointing the Members of the Panel 
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The assessment criteria of the Committee are more comprehensive 
than the standards stipulated in the Treaty.  It considers that judg-
es or advocates general from the Court of Justice should possess 
more than twenty years of experience with high-level duties and 
that judges at the General Court should have more than twelve 
years’ experience with similar duties.45  The Committee states that 
it assesses the candidates’ grasp of “the main aspects of EU law,” 
but it does not “seek to assess the scope and comprehensiveness” 
of the candidate’s expertise in EU law.46   The requirement to speak 
French remains a soft constraint, and the Committee expects the 
candidates to at least acquire proficiency in French “within a rea-
sonable time.”47 
 
To be sure, the Committee constitutes an encouraging first step 
in providing some safeguards to the appointment process, and a 
few Member States’ governments have recently overhauled their 
own selection processes to introduce more transparency and for-
mality.48  However, in a few countries, such as Greece, Italy, and 
Spain, appointment remains exclusively controlled by the execu-
tives.49  Moreover, the power of the Committee is very limited.  It 
has no power to nominate or choose between candidates but only 
has the power to consider one candidate at a time and to issue a 
non-binding opinion.50  The composition of the Committee also 
suffers from democratic deficit.  The President of the Court nomi-
nates six of the seven members, and one is nominated by the Euro-
                                                                                                                        
Provided for in Article 255 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Un-
ion, art. 1, 2010 O.J. (L 50) 20, 20 (EU).  
45 The Council of the Eur. Union, Activity Report of the Panel Provided for in 
Article 255 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 6509/2011, at 
9–10 (Feb. 17, 2011), http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=
ST%206509%202011%20INIT [https://perma.cc/FM3W-N8PU]. 
46 The Council of the Eur. Union, Third Activity Report of the Panel provided 
for in Article 255 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 19, SN 
11118/2014 (Dec. 13, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/
application/pdf/2014-02/rapport-c-255-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XHU-T2F9]. 
47 Id. 
48 Dumbrovský, supra note 43.  
49 Id. at 467. 
50 TFEU, supra note 9, at art. 255.  See also Dumbrovský, supra note 43, at 459 
(describing the power of the panel to give a favorable or unfavorable opinion but 
not including any nomination powers). 
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pean Parliament.51   
 
By December 2013, the Committee had examined thirty-two 
new candidates and delivered seven unfavorable opinions on can-
didates from Greece, Italy, Cyprus, Romania, Sweden, Lithuania, 
and the Czech Republic.52  These candidates were all running for 
positions at the General Court.  A few candidates were rejected for 
lack of professional experience, on the basis that their “length of 
high-level professional experience” was “manifestly too short.”53 
Some candidates were rejected for “insufficient familiarity with EU 
law.”54   
This disturbing fact reflects the severity of the lack of quality 
control by some nominating states during the selection process. 
 
Without rigorous procedural safeguards for judicial appoint-
ment, the quality of the EU judges appointed to the Court is bound 
to vary significantly.  Interviewees indicated that the less capable 
the EU judge is, the more he or she will need to rely on the réfé-
rendaires to carry out the judicial functions.55  As a consequence, 
the voices of référendaires are amplified, and in some instances 
they even effectively become the judges behind the scenes.56   
 
3.2.  Compensation  
 
The Court is an attractive workplace for European jurists, not 
                                                     
51 Id. at 460. 
52 Dumbrovský, supra note 43.  
53 The Council of the Eur. Union, supra note 46, at 20. 
54 Id. 
55 Telephone Interview with Former Référendaire (Apr. 29, 2015) (notes on 
file with Author); Interview with Former Référendaire, London, Eng. (April 10, 
2015) (notes on file with Author); Interview with Former Référendaire, London, 
Eng. (April 10, 2015) (notes on file with Author); Interview with Member of the 
Court, in London, Eng. (Mar, 12, 2015) (notes on file with Author); Interview with 
Former Référendaire, in London, Eng. (Feb. 19, 2015) (notes on file with Author); 
Interview with Member of the Court, in Luxembourg (May 5, 2014) (notes on file 
with Author); Interview with Current Référendaire, in Luxembourg (May 5, 2014) 
(notes on file with Author); Interview with Current Référendaire, in Luxembourg 
(May 5, 2014) (notes on file with Author). 
56 See supra note 55 (referring to the same series of interviews). 
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only for its prestige but also its generous compensation package.  
Currently the President of the Court of Justice is entitled to a 
€306,654 (equivalent to the President of the Commission) annual 
salary.  The Vice President is entitled to €277,767 (equivalent to the 
Vice-President of the Commission), and other judges and advo-
cates general are entitled to €249,989 (equivalent to a Commission-
er of the Commission).57  They also enjoy generous entertainment 
allowances ranging from €7,292 for ordinary judges to €17,016 an-
nually for the President.58  The Presidents of the chambers are enti-
tled to an additional €9,729.59  In addition, EU judges enjoy gener-
ous fringe benefits, including a car and a driver and a residence 
allowance equal to 15% of their salary.60  When they leave the 
bench, EU judges are also entitled to generous pension benefits61 
and transitional allowances.62  The judges from the General Court 
similarly enjoy a generous compensation package even though 
their salaries are lower.  Currently the President of the General 
Court is entitled to €249,989 in yearly salary; the Vice President is 
entitled to €239,990; and other judges are entitled to €231,101.63  
They also receive entertainment allowances ranging from €6,650 
for ordinary judges to €7,292 annually for the President.64  The 
Presidents of the chambers are entitled to an additional €8,873 each 
                                                     
57 See Council Regulation 422/67/EEC, 5/67/Euratom of the Council of 25 
July 1967 Determining the Emoluments of the President and Members of the 
Commission, of the President, Judges, Advocates-General and Registrar of the 
Court of Justice, of the President, Members and Registrar of the General Court 
and of the President, Members and Registrar of the European Union Civil Service 
Tribunal, art. 2, 1967 O.J. (L 187) 222, 222 (showing salary and pension infor-
mation by different criteria such as age, years of service, title, etc.).  See also Coun-
cil Regulation No 31 (EEC), 11 (EAEC), Laying Down the Staff Regulations of Of-
ficials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European 
Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community [hereinafter 
Staff Regulations], art. 66, 1962R0031, 
http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/aboutus/jobs/documents/staff_regulations_2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XHV7-UB4F] (laying out the monthly salaries for EU staff 
members). 
58 Council Regulation 422/67/EEC, supra note 57, at art. 4(3). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at art. 4.  
61 Id. 
62 Id. at art. 7.   
63 Id. at art. 21(a)(2). 
64 Id. at art. 21(a)(3). 
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year.65  Salaries of EU judges are subject to both income tax and a 
solidarity levy.66  For instance, the net salary of a judge at the Court 
of Justice (with no management role) with no dependent spouse or 
children is €203,652.67 
   
As one of the criteria for appointment to the Court of Justice is 
that the candidate should possess the qualifications required for 
appointments to the national Supreme Court, I use the salary of the 
national Supreme Court judges as a crude proxy for the pre-
existing salary of EU judges.  To be sure, some members of the 
Court were in private practice immediately before they joined the 
Court and they could have enjoyed higher incomes than national 
Supreme Court justices.  However, such members are only a small 
minority.  As shown in Appendix I, 74% of the Court members 
were civil servants (27%), academics (19%), or national court judg-
es (28%) immediately before joining the Court.  Only 7% were en-
gaged in private practice, with most coming from the UK and Ire-
land.   
 
Table 1 below compares both the gross and net annual salary of 
judges from national Supreme Courts and those of an ordinary 
judge at the Court of Justice.  Table 2 adjusts for the cost of living 
and provides the equivalent salary of national Supreme Court 
judges if they live in Luxembourg.  These two tables show that the 
vast majority of EU judges received a significant pay raise, particu-
larly for judges from Eastern European countries.  This stands in 
sharp contrast to the status of judicial salaries in the United States, 
where most judges could earn significantly higher wages when 
working for other employers.  However, the relatively low US 
wages have not prevented the US judiciary from attracting the best 
legal minds.  Indeed, judicial positions are highly regarded in the 
United States and “[come] as a kind of crowning achievement rela-
tively late in life.”68   
                                                     
65 Id. 
66 E-mail from Press and Information Unit, Court of Justice of the European 
Union to Author (July 22, 2015, 06:38 GMT) (on file with Author). 
67 Id. 
68 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW 
TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN 
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Table 1:  Comparison of Salaries of National Supreme Court 
































                                                                                                                        
AMERICA 34 (3d ed. 2007). 
69 The salary data of judges at the national Supreme Courts is compiled based 
on the 2012 data collected by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Jus-
tice.  Eur. Comm’n for the Efficiency of Justice, European Judicial Systems–Edition 
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* As described above, according to the data provided by the 
Court, the current gross annual salary of a judge at the Court of 
Justice (with no management role) is €249,989; the net annual sala-
ry of such a judge with no dependents (spouse and/or children) is  
€203,652. 
 
Table 2:  Comparison of Salaries of National Supreme Court 













Salary of  
National  
Supreme 

















Bulgaria 70,048 63,038 4.1 3.8 
Lithuania 54,568 41,471 5.3 5.8 
Hungary 74,293 53,634 3.9 4.5 
Latvia 62,693 42,622 4.6 5.7 
Malta 58,151 47,594 4.9 5.1 
Romania 93,442 65,540 3.1 3.7 
Slovakia 74,637 N/A 3.9 N/A 
Estonia 73,028 57,606 3.9 4.2 
Czech 101,760 N/A 2.8 N/A 
Greece 79,547 65,623 3.6 3.7 
Poland 130,710 93,096 2.2 2.6 
Croatia 113,051 56,096 2.5 4.3 
Slovenia 92,044 49,463 3.1 4.9 
                                                     
70 The salary of national Supreme Court judges is adjusted using the 2014 
price level index compiled by Eurostat.  The index is available online.  Comparative 




#Price_level_indices [https://perma.cc/XG8H-SL3D].   
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Portugal 98,080 N/A 2.9 N/A 
Sweden 90,720 N/A 3.2 N/A 
Germany 123,189 N/A 2.3 N/A 
Spain 138,794 86,052 2.1 2.8 
France 122,313 104,180 2.4 2.3 
Belgium 130,616 62,241 2.2 3.9 
Austria 134,323 46,450 2.1 5.2 
Finland 125,561 76,637 2.3 3.1 
Nether-






Cyprus 179,621 N/A 1.6 N/A 
Denmark 153,712 N/A 1.9 N/A 
Italy 211,467 115,098 1.4 2.1 
Ireland 195,642 N/A 1.5 N/A 
UK 252,006 N/A 1.1 N/A 
 
 
* As described above, an EU judge receives a residence allow-
ance which equals 15% of the judge’s salary and is not subject to 
tax, and thus the gross annual salary of a EU judge at the Court of 
Justice with the residence allowance is €287,487, and the net annual 
salary is €241,150. 
 
Economists have long argued that when the appointment pro-
cess is crude, the quality of the judges selected will actually be 
higher when judges are willing to accept a pay-cut to join the judi-
ciary.71  This is because unlike private employees, the government 
cannot use external monitors to discipline the performance of 
                                                     
71 See Stephen J. Choi et al., Are Judges Overpaid? A Skeptical Response to Judi-
cial Salary Debate, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 47, 55 (2009) (stating how individuals that 
are committed to furthering the public welfare or that are hard workers are more 
willing to become judges even with lower salaries); Paul E. Greenberg & James A. 
Haley, The Role of Compensation Structure in Enhancing Judicial Quality, 15 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 417, 418 (1986) (explaining that those willing to accept a reduction in com-
pensation in exchange for positions as judges seek non-pecuniary benefits of hold-
ing such a position and are therefore more likely to be better judges because non-
pecuniary driven individuals are more likely to show self-restraint).  
  
2016] THE FACELESS COURT 91 
 
 
judges.  Instead, the government relies primarily on judges’ own 
self-restraint to promote excellence.  For those who are willing to 
accept a lower salary, they are signaling that they view the non-
pecuniary benefits of being a judge as outweighing the pecuniary 
loss they suffer.72  These individuals are more likely to exhibit self-
restraint, a desirable quality for good judges.73   
 
To be sure, if a salary is set too low, the attractiveness of the ju-
dicial positions will be eroded, and the quality and independence 
of the judiciary will be threatened.74  However, EU judges’ salary is 
currently set at a level that far exceeds the pre-existing salary for 
the vast majority of national Supreme Court judges.  It is therefore 
very likely that most judges received a significant pay raise for be-
ing appointed to the Court.  Such a salary structure is not only go-
ing to attract more qualified candidates but also those less genuine-
ly interested in judging than in the perks and benefits the job 
brings.  As the EU judicial appointment process is often opaque 
and political, a higher salary could attract those primarily seeking a 
leisurely life in Luxembourg or those yearning for power and in-
fluence.  As Choi and his co-authors argue, leisure seekers would 
need a higher salary to support their leisurely activities (e.g., ex-
pensive vacations), and power seekers would find it more satisfy-
ing to work for a high-paying job, as higher salary entails higher 
social status.75  Therefore, when the appointment is not strictly 
made on the merits, a high salary increases the chance that ap-
pointments are used as political patronage to reward loyal func-
tionaries or political allies.  Interviewees observed that some judg-
es who received significant pay increases are indeed political 
appointees who are not competent to perform their duties and are 
dominated by their référendaires.76   
                                                     
72 Greenberg, supra note 71, at 418. 
73 Id.  
74 Id. at 421.  
75 Choi, supra note 71, at 55.  
76 Telephone Interview with Former Référendaire (Apr. 29, 2015) (notes on 
file with Author); Interview with Former Référendaire, in London, Eng. (Apr. 10, 
2015) (notes on file with Author); Interview with Former Référendaire, in London, 
Eng. (Feb. 19, 2015) (notes on file with Author); Interview with Member of the 
Court, in Luxembourg (May 5, 2014) (notes on file with Author); Interview with 
Current Référendaire, in Luxembourg (May 5, 2014) (notes on file with Author); 
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3.3.  Tenure 
 
EU judges serve renewable six-year terms.  On average, judges 
at the General Court served eight years, judges at the Court of Jus-
tice served nine years, and advocates general served seven years, 
as indicated in Appendix II.  But the variability is quite high.  The 
longest a judge has served at the Court is twenty-one years, and 
the shortest stay is less than a year.  Furthermore, over 42% of the 
EU judges served no more than six years.  In particular, 41% of 
judges appointed to the Court of Justice and 52% of judges ap-
pointed to the General Court were not renewed after serving one 
term.   
 
This short tenure hampers the productivity of judges.  Judges 
require a year or two to familiarize themselves with the court’s 
procedures and style.77  As shown in Appendix I, only 18% and 5% 
of the judges at the General Court and the Court of Justice have 
clerked at the Court before.  Some judges who are not familiar with 
the Court’s procedures and formality complained that they did not 
get sufficient support when they first started their jobs.78  Every 
three years, half of the judges at the Court are subject to renewal.  
These judges cannot take on much responsibility for about six 
months before their departure, which causes great instability in the 
formation of the chambers of judges and their work.79  Thus, if a 
judge stays at the Court for only one term, his productive time 
spent on the Court is likely to be only three to four years.  Worse 
yet, Judge Franklin Dehousse from the General Court observed 
                                                                                                                        
Interview with Current Référendaire, in Luxembourg (May 5, 2014) (notes on file 
with Author). 
77 See Marc van der Woude, Judge, Eur. Union Gen. Court, Presentation at 
King’s College London: The General Court: The Need and Opportunity for Re-
form (Mar. 8, 2013) (presenting the slides available at https://
www.kcl.ac.uk/law/research/centres/european/KCL-Marc-van-der-Woude-
GC-Reform-08-03-13.pdf). 
78 Interview with Former Référendaire, in London, Eng. (Apr. 10, 2015) (notes 
on file with Author).  
79 House of Lords, Eur. Union Comm., Report of Session 2006-2007, An EU 
Competition Court 96 (2007) (testimony from John Cooke, a former Irish judge at 
the General Court). 
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that in 2011 50% of judges at his Court were appointed outside the 
normal triennial renewal procedure.80  As he noted:  “The General 
Court is thus in permanent reorganization, and regularly looks like 
the waiting room of an airport, with permanent new arrivals, de-
partures, announcements . . . and delays.”81 
 
Moreover, the requirement of French on the job further ham-
pers judicial performance.  Since the expansion of the EU in 2004, a 
growing number of judges, especially those from Eastern European 
states, have found it difficult to deliberate in French.82  This is be-
cause French is not a widely spoken language in Eastern European 
and Nordic countries,83 and it has been difficult for these countries 
to identify competent candidates that are suitable for the position.84  
Thus, if a judge expects that he will only be on the job for a short 
period of time, he will be less likely to invest time to improve his 
French or learn EU law.  This uncertainty in judicial re-
appointment and the high turnover of EU judges means that judg-
es must rely more heavily on their référendaires to do the work for 
them.85   
                                                     
80 FRANKLIN DEHOUSSE, EGMONT PAPER NO. 53, THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS 
THE NEED OF A MANAGEMENT APPROACH 14 (2011), http://
www.egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/ep53.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2V4U-9NBH]. 
81 Id.  
82 Editorial Comments, The Court of Justice in Limelight Again, 45 COMMON 
MKT. L. REV. 1571, 1577 (2008).   
83 See Eur. Comm’n, Europeans and Their Languages Report, 31, Special Eu-
robarometer no. 386,  (2012), http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/
ebs/ebs_386_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FNY-Y5F8] (showing that only 1% of the 
population in many eastern European countries and less than 5% of the popula-
tion in Nordic countries were able to speak French well enough to have a conver-
sation).  
84 Telephone Interview with Former Référendaire (Apr. 29, 2015) (notes on 
file with Author); Interview with Former Member of the Court, in London, Eng. 
(Feb. 10, 2015) (notes on file with Author).  See also Konrad Schiemann, The Func-
tioning of the Court of Justice in An Enlarged Union and the Future of the Court, in 
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN EU LAW: ARTICLES IN HONOR OF SIR FRANCIS JACOB 3, 10 
(Anthony Arnull et al. eds., 2008) (explaining how it is very difficult to find judges 
that have the necessary French language skills to provide meaningful input in 
complex cases).  
85 Telephone Interview with Former Référendaire (Apr. 29, 2015) (notes on 
file with Author); Interview with Former Member of the Court, in London, Eng. 
(Feb. 10, 2015) (notes on file with Author); Interview with Member of the Court, in 
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4.  RÉFÉRENDAIRES  
 
Référendaires are a hidden workforce within the Court.  Some 
call them the Court’s “ghost writers.”86  Their names are never 
mentioned in any judgments nor does the Court publicize their 
profiles.  Nonetheless, they play an indispensable role during the 
Court’s decision-making process.  While the working style of each 
judge is different and the involvement of référendaires varies, they 
generally assume the responsibility of digesting the written sub-
missions and ploughing through various annexes to understand 
the facts and reasoning of each case.87  They also shoulder much of 
the responsibility for drafting the various reports and providing 
comments.88  
 
In February 2015, I used LinkedIn89 to hand-collect the back-
ground data for seventy-four current référendaires, of whom thir-
ty-one work for the Court of Justice and forty-three for the General 
Court.  This represents 25% of current référendaires at the Court of 
Justice and 46% of those at the General Court.90  In March 2015, I 
hand-collected the background data of 103 former référendaires 
                                                                                                                        
Luxembourg (May 5, 2014) (notes on file with Author); Interview with Current 
Référendaire, in Luxembourg (May 5, 2014) (notes on file with Author); Interview 
with Current Référendaire, in Luxembourg (May 5, 2014) (notes on file with Au-
thor).  
86 Michal Bobek, The Court of Justice of the European Union, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF EU LAW 153, 169 (Anthony Arnull & Damian Chalmers eds., 2015). 
87 See Sally J. Kenney, Beyond Principals and Agents: Seeing Courts as Organiza-
tions by Comparing Référendaires at the European Court of Justice and Law Clerks at the 
U.S. Supreme Court, 33 COMP. POL. STUD. 593, 611 (2000) (showing how référen-
daires take on great responsibility for examining the submissions filed at the 
Court, preparing the reports for hearings, assisting with the drafting of opinions, 
and how these tasks vary according to the role of the judge they work for).   
88 Id.  See also DIANE HANSEN-INGRAM, Tales from the Tartan Chambers, in A 
TRUE EUROPEAN: ARTICLES FOR JUDGE DAVID EDWARD 1, 3 (Mark Hoskins & William 
Robinson eds., 2004) (observing how Judge David Edward delegated work to his 
référendaires).  
89 LinkedIn, https://www.linkedin.com/ [https://perma.cc/CNS5-8MLJ] 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2016). 
90 The LinkedIn data has been cross-referenced with EU’s official directory 
“Whoiswho,” which discloses the names of the current référendaires.  EU 
Whoiswho, supra note 15. 
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from LinkedIn.  The summary statistics of the education and pro-
fessional experience of these référendaires are presented in Ap-
pendix III.  Their years of prior work experience and tenure at the 
Court are presented in Appendix IV.  
 
Admittedly, since the data is collected from LinkedIn, it is like-
ly that some groups are underrepresented in the samples.  Law 
firms and other private businesses tend to rely more on 
headhunters who use LinkedIn to tap talents than public institu-
tions, which normally have formal channels for recruitment.  
Therefore, former référendaires who are currently working for 
public institutions such as national governments, national judiciar-
ies, and EU institutions are less incentivized to use LinkedIn than 
those who are in private practice.  Similarly, current référendaires 
who plan to work for public institutions upon departing the Court 
are less incentivized to use LinkedIn than those who wish to go in-
to private practice.  This is especially true for référendaires who 
were seconded from public institutions.  For instance, interviewees 
indicate that a sizeable portion of référendaires are administrative 
judges from France but none of them appear in the samples.91  No-
tably, the bias is probably more pronounced for former référen-
daires as current référendaires have a number of exit options avail-
able to them.   
 
4.1.  The Labor Market  
 
Like law clerks in the United States, référendaires are chosen 
by the individual judges who can also fire them at will.  However, 
unlike the United States, where federal law clerks are recruited 
through an open online system,92 the Court lacks an official re-
                                                     
91 Interview with Current Référendaire, in Luxembourg (May 5, 2014) (notes 
in file with Author); Interview with Current Référendaire, in Luxembourg (May 5, 
2014) (notes in file with Author) 
92 See OSCAR, U.S. COURTS, https://oscar.uscourts.gov/home 
[https://perma.cc/9NKR-GKUG] (allowing US federal judges to post law clerk 
positions and law students to use the same platform to apply for clerkship).  Note, 
however, that the recruitment process of US federal judicial law clerks also faces a 
whole host of problems.  See e.g., Christopher Avery et al., The New Market for Fed-
eral Judicial Law Clerks, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 476–83 (2007) (highlighting explod-
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cruitment program.  Thus judges rely exclusively on informal 
channels to recruit référendaires, such as from among their former 
employees, subordinates, students, or those recommended by their 
personal friends or former colleagues.  Job seekers also lack infor-
mation regarding vacancies at the Court and the particular re-
quirements of judges.  Thus the labor market for référendaires is 
very inefficient for both buyers (the judges) and sellers (the réfé-
rendaires).  A référendaire who was interviewed noted that candi-
dates generally know someone already working there in order to 
get hired.93   
 
Meanwhile, the requirement of French as a working language 
significantly limits the pool of eligible candidates for référendaires.  
Compared with the diverse nationalities of EU judges, the back-
ground of référendaires is relatively homogeneous.  The require-
ment of French as a working language significantly limits the pool 
of eligible candidates for référendaires.  Therefore, native French 
speakers enjoy an inherent advantage.   
 
As a consequence, the network of référendaires becomes rela-
tively impermeable to outsiders.  The sample of seventy-four cur-
rent and 103 former référendaires I collected from LinkedIn pro-
vides strong support for this observation.  As shown in Table 3 
below, the three schools most attended by these référendaires are 
all located in French-speaking countries:  College of Europe 
(23.6%), Université Panthéon-Assas (10.3%), and Université 
Panthéon-Sorbonne (9.7%).  It should be noted, however, that Col-
lege of Europe also offers a significant portion of its classes in Eng-
lish.  The leading former employer is the Court itself (16.9%), as 
many référendaires used to work as linguists or researchers in the 
Court, followed by the Commission (13.6%); these two bodies far 
exceed the third most common former employers Van Bael & Bellis 
(4%) and Linklaters (4%).  Indeed, the employment of internal ad-
ministrative staff to fill in the référendaire positions shows the im-
portance that judges place on understanding the institutional 
workings of the Court.  It also reveals the closed nature of the net-
                                                                                                                        
ing offers, high market compression, and moral dilemmas as some of the issues of 
the US federal judicial recruitment system). 
93 Telephone interview with Current Référendaire (Feb. 12, 2015) (notes on 
file with Author).   
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work inside the Court.  
 
Table 3:  Most Common Law Schools and Former Employers 
Among a Sample of 177 Référendaires 
 
                                                     
94 Twelve of the 177 référendaires’ LinkedIn profiles contain no education 
background.  The data here therefore only presents the education information of 
165 référendaires.  
95 Thirteen of the 177 référendaires’ LinkedIn profiles contain missing infor-
mation about their work experience so it is possible that the actual shares of these 
former employers are higher than what is presented here.   
Most Common 
Law  Schools94 
% Most Common  Former 
Employers95 
% 
1. College of Eu-
rope 23.6 
1. Court of Justice of the 
European Union 16.9 
2. Université 
Panthéon-Assas 






Sorbonne (Paris I) 9.7 




3. Linklaters LLP 
4.0 
5. King's College 
London 7.9 
5. Cleary Gottlieb Steen 
& Hamilton LLP 3.4 
6. Université Libre 
de Bruxelles 7.3 




7. European Free Trade 
Association 2.3 
8. Katholieke Uni-
versiteit Leuven 6.1 










haus Deringer LLP 
2.3 
10. Institut 
d'études politiques 4.8 
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Figure 1 is a sociogram of the network data of these référen-
daires.96  Each node represents one of the 177 référendaires.  Two 
types of network connections are presented here:  a green line be-
tween nodes indicates that the two référendaires were classmates 
at law school, while an orange line indicates that they overlapped 
with one another at a previous workplace.  The defining feature of 
this sociogram is a large cluster of dense connection among 117 ré-
férendaires (66%), with three small clusters of référendaires be-
longing to smaller social network groups.  Only 46 nodes (26%) are 
isolated, indicating that the vast majority of référendaires have 
strong in-group ties and most likely had connections with the 
Court prior to joining.  Figure 1 also reveals that those référen-
daires who received legal education in French-speaking countries 
and who were formerly employed by either the Court or the 
Commission are tightly interconnected at the center of the socio-
gram.  These référendaires possess valuable social capital as their 











                                                     
96 The network data only shows the connection among the 177 référendaires 
based on their LinkedIn profiles.  As the profiles of some référendaires are incom-
plete (as discussed in supra notes 94 and 95 and the accompanying text), it is pos-
sible that there are more connections among these référendaires than what is pre-
sented in Figure 1 here.  
97 RONALD S. BURT, BROKERAGE & CLOSURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL 
CAPITAL 4 (2005).   
de Paris (Sciences 
Po Paris) 
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Figure 1:  The Social Network of a Sample of 177 Référen-
daires98 
 
(Notes:  The color of the nodes represents the educational 
background of référendaires.  Blue (white) nodes represent those 
référendaires who received (did not receive) their legal education 
in France, Belgium, or Luxembourg.  The shape of the nodes repre-
sents the previous work experience of référendaires.  Triangles 
represent the référendaires formerly employed at the Commission.  
Upside-down triangles represent the référendaires who used to 
work in other positions at the Court.  Double-triangles represent 
former employment at both bodies.  Circles represent référendaires 
who had never worked at either the Court or the Commission.  The 
lines represent the ties between référendaires.  Orange lines indi-
cate that the référendaires were former colleagues.  Green lines in-
dicate that the référendaires were classmates at law school.  Black 
lines indicate both.) 
 
Because of this relatively closed network, current référendaires 
become attractive candidates for new judges.  Normally, a référen-
daire only serves one judge at a time and will not switch to another 
judge during the former's tenure.  Référendaires can, however, be 
“inherited” by other judges upon the departure of the original 
judge.  Thus an internal labor market of référendaires exists within 
                                                     
98 Figure 1 can be viewed in color at: http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/
jil/vol38/iss1.  
  
100 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:1 
 
the Court.  As shown in Appendix III, within the sample of seven-
ty-four current référendaires, 37% from the General Court and 30% 
from the Court of Justice have served at the Court longer than their 
judges, indicating that they must have worked for more than one 
judge.   
 
Appendix III reveals another important feature of référen-
daires—the vast majority of them are experienced lawyers prior to 
the joining the Court and many have varied experiences.  In par-
ticular, 20% of current référendaires worked in other positions in 
the Court (such as linguists and researchers); 12% served in their 
respective national governments, 20% worked at the Commission; 
24% held academic positions; and 37% were in private practice.  
For former référendaires, 7% held other positions in the Court; 8% 
worked in the national courts; 18% were government officials; 7% 
worked for the Commission; 27% held academic positions; and 
56% were in private practice.  Notably, a significantly higher per-
centage of former référendaires were engaged in private practice 
than that of current référendaires.  This is probably due to the fact 
that the sample of the former référendaires is more biased towards 
over-representing private attorneys and under-representing law-
yers at public institutions.   
 
As shown in Appendix IV, the average prior working experi-
ence of current and former référendaires is six years and four 
years, respectively.  These figures contrast with those for law clerks 
from the United States, the vast majority of whom are fresh gradu-
ates rather than experienced lawyers.  This seems to suggest that 
EU judges rely more heavily on their clerks to do the work for 
them than US judges do.   
 
4.2.  Career Structure and Conservatism 
 
Référendaires are well paid.  Like employees at other EU insti-
tutions, the salary of référendaires is mainly tied to age and senior-
ity at the Court.  For instance, a référendaire who was hired at the 
age of thirty-five before 2004 would be awarded a grade of A11 
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(step 1) and is entitled to a basic salary of approximately €110,374.99  
After he works for the Court for ten years, he will be graded A14 
(Step 1) and be entitled to approximately €159,866.100  Therefore, 
the older and more experienced the référendaire, the more expen-
sive he or she becomes.  Judges, however, do not bear the cost of 
hiring référendaires.  While there is a quota on how many référen-
daires a judge can have, there is no limit on the cost of référen-
daires.  Judges may therefore have a preference for référendaires 
with more seniority and experience, even though they are costli-
er.101  
 
Unlike employees at other EU institutions, référendaires are 
not eligible for promotion.  Some however are elected to become 
judges later in their careers.  As shown in Appendix I, 18% of judg-
es from the General Court, and 5% of judges and 11% of advocates 
general from the Court of Justice had experience working as réfé-
rendaires before joining the Court.  Few however are elected to be-
come judges directly.102  But this lack of career advancement has 
not discouraged référendaires from pursuing long-term careers at 
the Court.  Financial benefit is an important consideration.  Réfé-
rendaires enjoy compensation packages similar to officials at other 
EU institutions.  After ten years of service, référendaires are eligi-
ble for generous pensions as civil servants when they reach the age 
                                                     
99 Staff Regulations, supra note 57, at art. 66.  Similar to judges, référendaires’ 
income is also subject to a community tax and a solidarity tax.  See Permanent Offi-
cials, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/job/official/index_
en.htm#4 [https://perma.cc/VK3Z-Q36U] (showing the taxes European servants 
are subject to); E-mail from Press and Information Unit, supra note 41 (nothing the 
taxes these salaries are subject to).   
100 Staff Regulations, supra note 57, at art. 66.  
101 For instance, Judge Dehousse suggested that the General Court could con-
sider creating a limited number of senior référendaire positions with six-year, re-
newable terms contractually linked to the General Court but not to a particular 
judge.  Dehousse, supra note 80, at 15. 
102 Based on the data disclosed by the Court, Mark Jaeger from Luxembourg, 
Maria Eugenia Martins de Nazare Ribeiro from Portugal, and Hubert Legal from 
France are examples of judges who worked as référendaires immediately before 
they joined the Court.  InfoCuria, General Court, CURIA, 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/p1_217427/en/ [https://perma.cc/X8AS-
VD5S] (last visited Oct. 8, 2016); InfoCuria, Presentation des Membres, CURIA, 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7035/fr/ [https://perma.cc/6LG5-927M] 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2016). 
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of sixty-six.103  A 1994 study found that the Court had fifty-six réfé-
rendaires at that time, among which the most tenured had served 
thirteen years; two référendaires had worked for twelve years, and 
one had worked for eleven years; with the average amount of work 
experience being five years.104  Based on the sample of seventy-four 
current référendaires, as seen in Appendix IV, on average référen-
daires have served more than seven years at the Court.  But the 
variability is once again quite high.  In fact, twenty-three (more 
than 31%) have served more than a decade.  One référendaire from 
the Court of Justice has served for more than twenty-two years, 
and one from the General Court has served for more than twenty-
six years, longer than the longest-serving judge in the Court’s his-
tory.105   
 
Despite the financial benefits, référendaires are temporary 
workers and do not have the same job security as officials in other 
EU institutions.  They can be fired by the judges at will and may 
not be able to find another job at the Court when their judges leave 
the bench.106  This job insecurity has a pronounced impact on how 
référendaires behave, especially for those who want to pursue a 
long-term career inside the Court.  Of course, the evaluation of ré-
férendaires solely depends on their performance to the satisfaction 
of their judges, but given the nature of the work delegated to réfé-
rendaires, judges are unlikely to encourage their référendaires to 
take a bold, intellectually challenging approach to law.107  This is 
especially true for career référendaires.108  
 
At the same time, the longevity of career référendaires also 
                                                     
103 See Staff Regulation, supra note 57, at art. 77.  
104 Kenney, supra note 87, at 605–06.  
105 Kenney notes that in the first two decades of the Court, each member of 
the Court had one référendaire who was a permanent employee, and each new 
member would inherit his or her successor’s référendaire.  Id. at 605.  But référen-
daires became temporary posts in the 1970s.  Id.  
106 For this reason, some référendaires took the requisite exams for EU civil 
servants and became functionaries, which then qualified them to work for other 
EU institutions.  Telephone Interview with Current Référendaire (Feb. 26, 2015) 
(notes on file with Author).  
107 Interview with Former Référendaire, in London, Eng. (Feb. 19, 2015) 
(notes on file with Author); Interview with Member of the Court, in Luxembourg 
(May 5, 2014) (notes on file with Author).   
108 Id.   
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gives them tremendous power.  Many EU judges serve relatively 
short tenures at the Court (almost 42% of them stay no more than 
six years).  Some judges lack a background in EU law or struggle 
with the French language (or both).  When judges first start at the 
Court, they lack adequate support and training to operate efficient-
ly and also need time to familiarize themselves with the Court’s 
working procedure and drafting styles.  In contrast, career référen-
daires are fluent in French, highly skilled in the Court’s drafting 
style, well-versed in EU law and precedents, and familiar with the 
institutional workings of the Court.  Therefore, less able judges rely 
heavily on these career référendaires.  Interviewees noted that be-
cause these référendaires have the tendency to strictly adhere to 
the Court’s precedents, formality, and style, they represent a force 
of conservatism and formalism at the Court.109   
 
The Court’s formalism can find its origin in the French legal 
tradition. When the Court was first established it was modeled af-
ter the prototype of the Conseil d’Etat— the highest administrative 
court in France.110  The French influence on the Court is profound 
and many of its rules and procedures are obvious derivatives of 
French administrative law.111  Compared with the common law 
tradition, the French legal tradition emphasized a high degree of 
procedural formalism to minimize the discretion of judges.112  As 
Judge Posner once described it:  “This is the idea that the judge has 
no will, makes no value choices, but is just a calculating ma-
chine.”113  Inevitably and invariably, the formalistic interpretation 
of law requires the Court to discount or even disregard economic 
                                                     
109 Id.  See also Karen McAuliffe, Precedent in the Court of Justice of the European 
Union: The Linguistic Aspect, 15 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 483, 488–91 (2013) (observ-
ing how the Court’s formalistic style of drafting imposes a serious constraint on 
the work of the référendaires, causing them to tend to strictly adhere to the lan-
guage of precedents).  
110 Edward, supra note 18, at 539. 
111 See Giuseppe Federico Mancini & David T. Keeling, Language, Culture and 
Politics in the Life of the European Court of Justice, 1 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 397, 399 (1994) 
(observing that France’s political and legal thinking hegemony framed the foun-
dational treaties of the European Union). 
112 Thorsten Beck & Ross Levine, Legal Institutions and Financial Development, 
in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 251, 255 (Claude Menard & Mary 
M. Shirley eds., 2005).   
113 Richard A. Posner, Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 IND. L. J. 1, 3 (1983). 
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realities.114  As observed by Marc van der Woude, a judge at the 
General Court, when asked what he likes the least about his job:  
 
“I have difficulties in finding negative aspects of my current 
job. However, there may be two things, which I sometimes find ir-
ritating and inefficient:  formalism and conservatism. Like many 
other lawyers, judges tend to have a disproportionate interest in 
form. Obviously, form is important, but the attention to form and 
detail should never distract from the substance of a case. Also, 
lawyers tend to be conservative and feel comforted by the exist-
ence of precedents. I am regularly confronted with arguments that 
do not have any other merit than referring to past practices or cus-
toms. This backward-looking mentality is not very helpful, if one 
wants to increase the Court’s productivity and the quality of its 
judgments.”115  
 
4.3.  Revolving Door 
 
Due to the relatively close social network and the difficulty of 
finding French-speaking candidates who are well-versed in EU 
law, Commission officials become an important source of talent.  
Based on the sample in Appendix III, 30% of current référendaires 
from the General Court used to work for the Commission—in par-
ticular 13% worked for the Legal Service, and 8% served at the Di-
rectorate-General for Competition.  The percentage at the Court of 
Justice is lower; 7% of current référendaires used to work for the 
Commission.  Indeed, Commission officials have the opportunity 
to seek secondment at the Court, while keeping their ranking with-
in the Commission.  For instance, the Legal Service, which is the in-
house department within the Commission and regularly represents 
the Commission in front of the Court, started to send secondees to 
the Court in the 1980s.116  Based on one study in 1994, among the 
                                                     
114 Barak Orbach, The Durability of Antitrust Formalism, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2197, 
2199 (2015).   
115 Nicolas Petit, Marc Van Der Woude, THE FRIDAY SLOT (Nov. 16, 2012), 
http://chillingcompetition.com/2012/11/16/the-friday-slot-13-marc-van-der-
woude/ [https://perma.cc/M52U-RK6J]. It should be noted that while Judge Van 
Der Woude’s statements seem to only mention judges, they should be interpreted 
to also include référendaires as they are often the judges behind the scenes.  
116 Interview with Former Référendaire, in London, Eng. (October 7, 2015) 
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fifty-six référendaires working at the Court at that time, six were 
seconded from the Commission.117    
 
Among the sample of former référendaires, 7% worked at the 
Commission prior to joining the Court.  Upon their departure, 16% 
joined the Commission (9% for the Legal Service), representing a 
9% increase.  This suggests that the experience of working as a ré-
férendaire is very valuable for the Commission, especially for the 
Legal Service.  As the skillsets at the Legal Service and the Court 
are highly transferable, even when a Commission employee does 
not join the Court on a secondment scheme, “the Commission is 
glad to take him or her back at the end of the period of being a ré-
férendaire,” as one former senior Commission official puts it.118   
 
Appendix V further examines thirty-five former and current ré-
férendaires who have had experience working at both the Com-
mission and the Court.  Among them, twelve served at the Com-
mission immediately before they joined the Court, twenty joined 
the Commission immediately after they left the Court (eleven 
joined the Legal Service), and five served both before and after.  On 
average they have eight years of experience at the Commission and 
four years of experience working at the Court, though the variance 
is very high.  This shows that a veritable revolving door exists be-
tween the Commission and the Court.    
 
Abundant literature in law, economics, and political science has 
voiced concern that revolving doors can lead to regulatory cap-
ture.119  As the EU’s main executive arm, the Commission is the 
most frequent party appearing in front of the Court.120  This raises 
                                                                                                                        
(notes on file with Author).  
117 Kenney, supra note 87, at 607.  
118 E-mail from Former Official, European Comm’n to Author (Feb. 12, 2015) 
(on file with Author).  
119  For a comprehensive survey of literature on the revolving door, see gen-
erally Wentong Zheng, The Revolving Door, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265 (2015) 
(explaining the need to recognize the “incentive for regulators to expand the mar-
ket demand for services they would be providing when they exit the govern-
ment”).  
120 Since the Court’s establishment, the Commission has served as a party in 
over 52% of the cases.  I hand-collected this data using the Court’s database.  In-
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the immediate question of whether adequate procedural safe-
guards exist to address the potential conflicts of interest between 
the Court and the Commission.  To be sure, a revolving door be-
tween business and government is not uncommon in Europe.  EU 
Staff Regulations have put in place specific measures that address 
this concern.  Before recruitment as an EU official, the candidate is 
required to inform the appointing authority of any actual or poten-
tial conflict of interest.121  Within two years after leaving the post, 
the official has the mandatory obligation to notify his institution of 
his occupational activity.122  If the activity is related to the work 
carried out by the official during the last three years of service and 
could lead to a conflict with the interests of the EU institution, the 
appointing authority may either forbid him from undertaking it or 
impose certain restrictions.123  In addition, senior EU officials are 
subject to a one-year “cooling off” period, which bans them from 
lobbying their former institutions “for their business, clients or 
employers on matters for which they were responsible during the 
last three years in service.”124     
 
It appears, however, that the EU Staff Regulations have never 
been applied to manage the potential conflicts of interest for offi-
cials moving between different EU institutions.  Based on the 
Court’s disclosure, référendaires have the obligation of declaring 
any actual or potential conflict of interest situation at the time of 
his or her employment.125  Yet according to the Rules for Good 
Conduct for référendaires adopted by the Court in 2009, référen-
daires only have the obligation to inform their judges or advocates 
general if they worked on the same case in their former workplac-
es. 126  It is then left up to their judges or advocates general to de-
                                                                                                                        
foCuria, supra note 31.  
121 Staff Regulations, supra note 57, at art. 11. 
122 Id. at art. 16. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125  E-mail from Access to Documents Unit, Court of Justice of the European 
Union to Author (Oct. 7, 2015) (on file with Author).  
126 La Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes, Decision du 17 Fe-
vrier 2009, Portant Adoption De Regles de Bonne Conduite des Referendaires, art. 
2(2) (Feb. 17, 2009).  The original version of the Code of Good Conduct is in 
French and was requested from the Court.   
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cide whether they can continue working on the same matter.127  
Even if they are prohibited from doing so, Commission secondees 
are free to work on any other cases as long as they were not per-
sonally involved in the matter.  Since the Commission is an im-
portant player in most EU cases, in reality Commission secondees 
cannot possibly be excluded from all cases in which the Commis-
sion appears. 
 
Another consequence of the revolving door is that it allows the 
Commission to conduct intelligence surveillance on the Court.  As 
Court membership is fluid and the preferences of individual judg-
es vary, the revolving door makes it possible for the Commission 
to keep pace with its changing landscape.  Commission secondees 
can sharpen their litigation tactics, for instance, by learning how to 
present arguments that can best persuade particular judges and ré-
férendaires at the Court.128  On the other hand, the private bar is at 
a comparative disadvantage.  Although the private bar can also at-
tract référendaires from the Court, they lack the economy of scale 
of the Commission.  The Legal Service of the Commission, which 
employs more than 200 lawyers,129 is a powerhouse that specializes 
in litigation before the Court.  Even though private law firms are 
also equipped with superb practitioners with in-depth knowledge 
of EU law, they lack a sufficient caseload to match the experience 
of the Legal Service.  Nor are private firms able to run a second-
ment program as the Commission does to closely monitor the 
Court.  While private firms could also engage experienced référen-
daires, the intelligence gathered by those hired tends to become 
stale within a few years.  
 
                                                     
127 Id.   
128 Telephone Interview with Current Référendaire (Mar. 12, 2015) (notes on 
file with Author); Telephone Interview with Current Référendaire (Feb. 19, 2015) 
(notes on file with Author).  
129 This is based on the Author’s search of the legal service department with-
in the European Commission on the official directory of the European Union.  EU 
Whoiswho, supra note 15. 
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4.4.  The French Dominance 
 
Compared with the diverse nationalities of EU judges, the 
background of référendaires is relatively homogeneous.  The re-
quirement of French as a working language significantly limits the 
pool of eligible candidates for référendaires.  Therefore, native 
French speakers enjoy an inherent advantage.  As Judge Mancini 
once remarked: 
 
“Yet the fact of having to speak French, which has been the 
Court’s working language since 1952, in the deliberation room and 
having to draft judgments in French, puts the non-francophones at 
a definite disadvantage vis-à-vis their brethren from France, Bel-
gium and Luxembourg.  Being of course accomplished gentlemen, 
they would never consciously take advantage of their colleagues’ 
handicap; but the full mastery of a language—is an irresistible 
weapon; and the owner of that weapon will not be likely to refrain 
from using it.”130 
 
According to data provided by the Court and provided in Ta-
ble 4,131 over 42% of référendaires at the Court of Justice are citi-
zens from Belgium, France, and Luxembourg.  At the level of the 
General Court the percentage is higher, at 49%.  The population of 
référendaires is concentrated among a few countries, especially 
those with the French legal origin and in Germany.  On the other 
hand, référendaires from the Nordic, common law, and ex-socialist 
countries are underrepresented.  Indeed, at the General Court there 
is only one référendaire from Nordic countries and two from 
common law countries. 
 
Using the country of origin as a crude proxy of the legal tradi-
tion132 in which a référendaire is bred, Table 4 also shows the 
strong influence of the French legal tradition on référendaires.  
This is consistent with the data provided in Appendix III, which 
indicates 79% of référendaires at the Court of Justice and 83% at 
                                                     
130 Mancini, supra note 111, at 398. 
131 E-mail from Access to Documents Unit, supra note 16.    
132 For the legal origin of each EU member state, see generally THOMAS H. 
REYNOLDS & ARTURO A. FLORES, FOREIGN LAW: CURRENT SOURCES OF CODES AND 
BASIC LEGISLATION IN JURISDICTIONS OF THE WORLD (1989).   
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the General Court were educated in law schools located in France, 
Belgium, or Luxembourg.  Few référendaires come from common 
law countries, indicating that the common law tradition probably 
has a relatively weak influence on référendaires working in the 
Court.   
 
While some référendaires with French legal educations also re-
ceive common law training, they are probably a minority.  For in-
stance, based on the education background of référendaires in the 
sample presented in Appendix III, 38% of current référendaires re-
ceived law degrees in common law countries.  But this figure is 
likely to overestimate the common law influence as the samples in 
Appendix III over-represent those référendaires with private prac-
tice backgrounds and under-represent those with public institution 
backgrounds.  This is because the private bar (particularly UK and 
US law firms) have a stronger preference for common law legal 
education than institutional employers.  Accordingly, it is likely 
that the actual percentage of current référendaires who received 
common law training is lower than 38%.  
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* Note that a number of référendaires have dual nationalities. 
** Switzerland is not a member of the Court, but there are two 
référendaires who hold dual citizenship with an EU member state 
and with Switzerland.  
 
5.  THE CONSEQUENCE OF BANNING DISSENTS 
 
Since its establishment, the Court has adopted a secretive de-
liberation process, with judges prohibited from revealing how the 
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Court reached its decision in a particular case.133  Over the years 
the Court has been subject to numerous criticisms for its practice of 
issuing a single judgment without dissents.134  While the practice of 
issuing a single judgment is common in civil law countries, the 
Court now finds itself alone among supranational and internation-
al courts (and the majority of national supreme courts and consti-
tutional courts in Europe) in prohibiting the publication of separate 
opinions.135  Nevertheless, the practice has persisted.   
 
One major reason for upholding this practice is to preserve the 
independence of judges, out of a fear that disclosure of votes will 
subject judges to political scrutiny in times of reappointment.136  
Another often-cited reason for banning dissents is to preserve the 
authority and legitimacy of the Court.137  Proponents of this line of 
reasoning argue that the “collegial” decision-making process 
means that the Court “holds together throughout the process of 
judgment,” and the minority is not excluded from the deliberations 
of the majority.138  Moreover, a single judgment enhances the 
Court's legitimacy as it fosters the public’s perception of the law as 
dependably stable and secure.139  While this was deemed especially 
valuable and crucial in the formative years of the Court, the argu-
ment is much less convincing today as the Court’s authority has 
been well established, and there are few incidents of non-
compliance. 
                                                     
133 See Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, supra note 5, at 
art. 2 (establishing the duty of judges to perform their duties impartially and in a 
confidential manner). 
134 E.g., HENRY G. SCHERMERS & DENIS F. WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 736 (6th ed. 2001) (showing the different arguments utilized 
to support the use of dissenting and concurring opinions). 
135 Vlad Perju, Reason and Authority in the European Court of Justice, 49 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 307, 309 (2009).  See also Director General for Internal Policy, Eur. Comm’n, 
Dissenting Opinion in the Supreme Court of the Member States 7 (2012), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/
cont/201304/20130423ATT64963/20130423ATT64963EN.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/56BU-USQB] (noting that only seven EU Member States never 
allow their Supreme Court judges to publish individual opinions). 
136 SCHERMERS, supra note 134. 
137 Id.  
138 Edward, supra note 18, at 556.  
139 Id. 
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At the same time, even proponents of the single judgment 
acknowledge its shortcomings.  A single judgment that takes into 
account different opinions inevitably tends to blur distinctions and 
resorts to qualifications, reducing the clarity of the judgment.  
Sometimes ambiguity and unequivocal language are used to cloak 
disagreement, leading to criticisms that some of the judgments are 
“simply oracular and almost apocryphal.”140  As Judge Edward 
maintains:  “A camel is said to be a horse designed by a committee, 
and some judgments of the Court of Justice are camels.”141  
 
Another risk with single judgments is that they make it more 
difficult to assess judicial performance and monitor judicial behav-
ior.  In the common law system, the reputation of a judge largely 
rests on his or her opinions.  This nourishes a judge’s ego by ena-
bling him to cultivate an admiring audience among his peers, prac-
titioners, law professors and the public at large.  However, EU 
judges cannot establish their individual reputation through judg-
ments.  The most they could claim is that they sat on the panel of a 
certain case, but the secrecy rule prevents them from making clear 
their personal contribution.  The unobservability of their inputs 
could therefore encourage free riding and judicial shirking.   
 
To be sure, judges face peer pressure when working at the 
Court and, thus, would also strive to win the respect of fellow jus-
tices and référendaires.  This is especially true at the Court of Jus-
tice, where the President has exercised discretion in assigning cases 
according to the competence and expertise of the judges.142  This 
works as both a carrot and a stick.  It incentivizes the judges to per-
form, because otherwise they risk being marginalized—assigned to 
small and unimportant cases and excluded from the grand cham-
ber.143  However, at the General Court cases are allocated on a basis 
of rotation, and the President at the General Court generally does 
                                                     
140 L. NEVILLE BROWN AND FRANCIS G. JACOB, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 55 (1977).  
141 Edward, supra note 18, at 556–57. 
142 Interview with Current Référendaire, in Luxembourg (May 5, 2014) (notes 
on file with Author); Interview with Current Référendaire, in Luxembourg (May 
5, 2014) (notes on file with Author). 
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not interfere with case allocation.144  As a consequence, judges at 
the General Court face fewer constraints than those at the higher 
court.  Moreover, given the short tenure of judges and the uncer-
tainty in judicial re-appointment, judges who know they are not 
renewed are less incentivized to put in effort.  As Rasmussen, one 
of the most vocal critics of the Court, once wrote:  
 
“[T]he ban on dissents has served to shield the identity of the 
judges making up the majority behind the Court’s decisions, thus 
shielding them from accountability.  When the names of the judges 
forming a fragile majority are made known, such a majority will 
certainly invest all their intellectual capacity into delivering well-
founded legal reasoning for their judgments; not the poor type of 
reasoning we have seen in the past ten or fifteen years.”145 
 
Such consequences have been observed elsewhere.  In the Unit-
ed States, where courts nowadays dispose of a significant percent-
age of cases by unpublished judgments, judges are seen as less 
likely to devote as much effort to unpublished opinions as they do 
to signed ones.146  Judges have observed that unpublished cases are 
prepared less carefully and are often delegated to staff attorneys or 
law clerks.147  As a commentator observed:  “When anonymity of 
                                                     
144 See Court of Justice of the Eur. Union, Criteria for Assigning Cases to 
Chambers, 2011 O.J. (C 232) 2, 2–3 (noting that the President of the General Court 
will not interfere with rotations unless cases are related or derogation is needed to 
ensure an even case workload).  See also Marc Barennes & Pascale Hecker, Strategic 
and Efficient Brief Writing Before the General Court of the European Union: Practical 
Suggestions Regarding the Application and the Reply in Competition Law Cases, 4 
CONCURRENCE 1, 7 (2012) (noting similarly that the President allocates cases on a 
rotation and, thus, no one chamber has exclusive access to competition cases). 
145 Hjalte Rasmussen & Louise Nan Rasmussen, Comment on Katalin Kele-
men—Activist EU Court “Feeds” on the Existing Ban on Dissenting Opinions: Lifting 
the Ban is Likely to Improve the Quality of EU Judgments, 14 GERMAN L. J. 1373, 1385 
(2013).  
146 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 
139 (1990).  See also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND 
REFORM 165 (2d prtg. 1999) (explaining that without the threat of the opinion be-
ing precedential, judges can use unpublished opinions to avoid professional criti-
cism or to “shove difficult issues under the rug in cases where a one-liner would 
be too blatant an evasion of judicial duty”).  
147 See Ginsburg, supra note 146 (explaining that “unsigned work products, 
more often than signed opinions, are fully composed by hands other than a 
judge’s own — by staff attorneys or law clerks — and let out with scant editing by 
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pronouncement is combined with security in office, it is all too easy 
for the politically insulated officials to lapse into arrogant ipse dix-
its.”148  This is not to say that EU judges are lazy.  They are simply 
trying to increase their productivity and spend time on things that 
they value more.  Indeed, despite their perennial complaint of an 
unbearable caseload, EU judges find time to contribute academic 
articles in great profusion and keep up a busy schedule of inter-
views, lectures, speeches, and conferences.  Some EU judges work 
very hard indeed.149  
 
Because separate opinions are disallowed, dissenting judges 
will not be able to exert a credible threat on the majority.  This 
could lead to the suppression of dissenting opinions.  A forceful 
dissent points out the inaccuracies and inadequacies in the majori-
ty’s opinion, and thus its “foremost and undeniable external con-
sequence” is to undermine the majority’s opinion.150  This puts 
pressure on the majority and increases its incentives to “get it 
right.”  Judge Fidelma Macken from Ireland recalled that one of 
her “most awful times” at the Court was when thirteen other judg-
es outvoted her in a case in which she was acting as the rappor-
teur.151  The case she was dealing with involved some cutting-edge 
trademark law issues, and she was the only person “on the Court 
of Justice with a very strong intellectual property background.”152  
Had Judge Macken been given the right to dissent, the majority 
would probably have taken her opinions more seriously.  Even if 
she was still outvoted, her dissent may still have served an alert 
function that would signal to the future court and legislature that 
the case could be troubling. 
 
Moreover, because consensus-building is highly valued in or-
                                                                                                                        
the supervising panel”).  
148 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
149 Judge David Edward, a prolific writer and one of the most highly regard-
ed EU judges, is exemplary in many regards.  See Hansen-Ingram, supra note 88, at 
3 (describing his secretary’s recollection).   
150 Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 19 J. SUP. CT. HISTORY 33, 35 (1994). 
151 J. H. H. Weiler & Judge Fidelman Macken, Lecture at the New York Uni-
versity Law School Distinguished Global Fellows Lecture Series: To Be A Europe-
an Constitutional Court Judge, A Conversation with Judge Fidelman Macken 
(Sept. 4, 2003).  
152 Id.  
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der to produce a single coherent judgment, it exerts pressures on 
judges to conform.  This could lead to “groupthink,” an undesira-
ble group decision-making phenomenon identified by scholars of 
organizational behavior.153  Scholars have found that because peo-
ple are extremely vulnerable to unanimous opinions, even a single 
dissenter is likely to create a huge impact.154  They observe that 
corporate boardrooms that encourage dissenting opinions are like-
ly to perform better than those that silence their members.155  One 
study shows that the highest-performing companies have extreme-
ly contentious boards that regard dissent as an obligation.156  
 
Skeptics note that even if EU judges were given the right to dis-
sent, they would be unlikely to do so, and thus it wouldn’t lead to 
a difference in practice anyway.157  Indeed, “dissent aversion” has 
been well documented in US appellate judging.158  Writing a dis-
sent requires effort and is costly to the author.159  Dissent also im-
poses a cost on the majority by requiring the latter to revise its 
opinions to address the concerns raised in the dissent.160  Judges do 
not like to be criticized,161 and thus dissents tend to fray collegiality 
among judges.162  Epstein and her coauthors predict that the more 
often judges sit together, the more likely they will be to invest in 
                                                     
153 See generally IRVING L. JANIS, GROUP THINK (2d ed. 1982) (analyzing infor-
mation from various scholars and publications on the role of “groupthink” in pol-
icy decisions). 
154 Id.  See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003) (ar-
guing that societies and nations are more likely to prosper with a healthy amount 
of dissent). 
155 Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, What Makes Great Boards Great, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Sept. 2002), https://hbr.org/2002/09/what-makes-great-boards-great 
[https://perma.cc/UR4E-ZPDR]. 
156 Id. 
157 See Director General for Internal Policy, supra note 135, at 36 (noting that 
dissents would not be mandatory and judges would remain free to continue their 
current practices).  
158 See generally Lee Epstein et al., Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical 
and Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101, 103 (2011) (explaining the phe-
nomenon regarding “‘dissent aversion’ which sometimes causes a judge not to 
dissent even when he disagrees with the majority opinion”). 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 104 
161 POSNER, supra note 32, at 32. 
162 Epstein, supra note 158, at 104. 
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collegiality and the less likely they will be to dissent.163  Applied to 
the EU context, we would expect more disagreement in a grand 
chamber than in a small chamber of three or five judges.  Nonethe-
less, it is important to recognize that having the option to dissent is 
different from actually exercising that option.  When judges are 
given the right to dissent, it is equivalent to the right of withdrawal 
in a collective enterprise.164  Having the right of withdrawal itself 
disciplines free-riders and creates a more credible threat to the ma-
jority, who need to consider dissenting opinions more carefully.  
 
Defenders of the single judgment note that the function of ad-
vocates general, who issue their own independent opinions for the 
Court, was created exactly to compensate for the lack of dissenting 
opinion.165  However, the function of the advocates general is an 
inferior substitute.  Advocates general have no voting power and 
do not participate in the deliberation.  Their opinions therefore ex-
ert less of a threat on the majority.  Moreover, advocates general 
now participate in a small proportion of cases and are called upon 
only in highly complex and difficult cases.166  And because advo-
cates general are appointed early on, the Court may well overlook 
some cases that only later turn out to be complex and difficult.167  
At the General Court, there is no dedicated member who serves as 
an advocate general.168  Sometimes a judge could be appointed as 
an advocate general on an ad hoc basis, but it is rare.  In the history 
of the General Court, there have been only eighteen occasions 
where the General Court has appointed an advocate general in 
                                                     
163 Id. 
164 See Justin Yifu Lin, Collectivization and China’s Agricultural Crisis in 1959-
1961, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1228, 1240–43 (1990) (arguing that it was the deprivation of 
the right to withdraw from a collective in 1958 that led to the agricultural crisis in 
1959–1961 in China). 
165 Director General for Internal Policy, supra note 135, at 35. 
166 Michal Bobek, A Fourth in the Court: Why Are There Advocates General in the 
Court of Justice?, 14 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. OF EUR. LEGAL STUD. 529, 535 (2011). 
167 See e.g., Case C-179/12P, The Dow Chemical Company v. Commission, 
2013 E.C.R. 1, 3 (involving an appeal which asserts that the General Court failed to 
properly examine various factors that would have been favorable to the appel-
lant). 
168 See Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, supra note 5, at 
art. 49 (noting that members may be designated the task of advocate general if 
and when needed). 
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competition cases.169  As a consequence, in the vast majority of 
competition cases it decided not to reap the supposed benefits of 
opinions from the advocates general.  
 
5.1.  A Case Study of the Microsoft Split 
 
On September 17, 2007, the General Court upheld the Commis-
sion’s decision finding that Microsoft had infringed EU competi-
tion law for refusing to supply interoperability information to 
competing suppliers of workgroup servers and for illegally tying 
Windows Media Player to the Windows PC operating system (“the 
Microsoft judgment”).170  The judgment is widely thought to be an 
important victory for the Commission, who suffered a series of 
setbacks in early 2000 when the General Court quashed a number 
of the Commission’s merger decisions.171  It further reinforced the 
Commission’s invincible record in abuse of dominance cases.  Ever 
since the establishment of the Court, few appeals against abuse of 
dominance cases brought by the Commission have been won on 
substantive grounds.172 
 
The Microsoft judgment, which runs 416 pages in the European 
Court Reports, offers a scathing criticism of Microsoft’s arguments 
and a strong endorsement of the Commission’s decision.173  It pro-
jects the image of a unanimous decision signed by thirteen judges 
in the Grand Chamber.  For many, the decision “came as some-
thing of a surprise.”174  Indeed, when Microsoft requested interim 
relief to suspend the Commission’s remedial orders in 2004, Bo 
                                                     
169 I hand-collected this data using the Court’s case search database.  Info-
Curia, supra note 31. 
170 Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3619, 4026–28. 
171 DANIEL J. GIFFORD & ROBERT T. KUDRLE, THE ATLANTIC DIVIDE IN ANTITRUST: 
AN EXAMINATION OF US AND EU COMPETITION POLICY 35 (2015). 
172 See Pablo Ibañez Colomo, The Law on Abuse of Dominance and the System of 
Judicial Remedies, 32 Y.B. OF EUR. L. 389, 403 (2013) (identifying only one judgment 
where the decision was annulled on substantive grounds since 1992).   
173 See Microsoft, 2007 E.C.R. at 3878–80 (describing one of many issues on 
which the Court quickly rules against Microsoft and dismisses its arguments). 
174 HARRY FIRST, STRONG SPINE, WEAK UNDERBELLY: THE CFI MICROSOFT 
DECISION, 1 (2007). 
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Vesterdorf, then President of the General Court, recognized that 
there was a serious dispute on a number of points.  Though he 
dismissed Microsoft’s request for interim relief, Vesterdorf held 
that Microsoft’s other arguments on interoperability and tying is-
sues could not be dismissed “as prima facie unfounded.”175  Why 
did the General Court, which appeared to entertain some points of 
Microsoft’s defense in 2004, completely demolish them in the later 
main action?  Answering this question requires unveiling the faces 
behind the Microsoft judgment.  
 
In March 2008, Bo Vesterdorf gave a lecture at Queen Mary 
School of Law at the University of London on the Microsoft judg-
ment.  The lecture was certainly timely, as Vesterdorf had presided 
over Microsoft and left the Court only a few months prior.176  It is 
common for EU judges to give keynote speeches and participate in 
panel discussions at public events.  But what was unusual about 
Vesterdorf’s speech was his comment at the end of the lecture:  
“From a purely academic point of view, it may be regretted that 
the judgment was not brought on appeal before the ECJ so Eu-
rope’s highest Court could have its final say in the case.”177  This 
statement sends a signal that he disagreed with the outcome of the 
case.  In other words, he was probably outvoted in Microsoft.  
 
His lecture, which was later published in the Queen Mary’s 
student law review, offers cautious and subtle criticisms of the Mi-
crosoft decision.  Understanding this critique requires some context.  
Earlier EU competition law precedents had identified a cumulative 
four-part test for identifying an abusive refusal to supply on the 
part of a dominant firm.  The refusal must:  (a) relate to a product 
or service indispensable to the exercise of a particular activity on a 
neighboring market; (b) exclude any effective competition in the 
neighboring market; (c) prevent the emergence of a new product 
for which there is a potential consumer demand; and (d) have no 
objective justification.178  Vesterdorf observed that the General 
                                                     
175 Id. (italics added). 
176 Bo Vesterdorf, Article 82 EC: Where Do We Stand After the Microsoft Judg-
ment?, GLOBAL ANTITRUST REV. 1, 14 (2008), http://www.icc.qmul.ac.uk/
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Court had expanded the scope of each of these conditions in order 
to dismiss Microsoft’s claims.  
 
First, he observed that the General Court had deviated from 
earlier cases such as Volvo, Magill and IMS Health, and Commercial 
Solvent and expanded the concept of “indispensability” to cover 
“economic indispensability.”179  He noted that this would make it 
easier for the Commission to satisfy its burden of proof in abuse 
cases and leave intellectual property holders with more uncertain-
ty as to when its refusal to grant a license could be deemed abu-
sive.180  He further noted that the judicial scrutiny of the Commis-
sion’s assessment of what would be deemed “economically viable” 
is very limited, given the fact that the Commission enjoys a margin 
of appreciation in economically complex assessments.181  
 
With regards to the second requirement, Vesterdorf also noted 
a shift from the requirement in case law such as IMS Health and 
Magill.182  He observed that the Court had shifted from the elimina-
tion of all competition to the elimination only of effective competi-
tion, which loosened the condition and again made it easier for the 
Commission to satisfy its burden of proof.183  
 
Regarding the third requirement of “new products,” Vesterdorf 
found that the Court also expanded the requirement in IMS and 
Magill to not only cover “production or markets, but also . . . tech-
nical development.”184  As such, “prevention of technical develop-
ment” could be deemed abusive.185  Further, Vesterdorf expressed 
concern that the Court, while dismissing Microsoft’s objective justi-
fication for refusing to deal, left open the question of how the bur-
den of proof could be satisfied by the dominant undertaking.186  
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The second issue in Microsoft deals with whether the Windows 
operating system and Media Player are two separate products and 
Microsoft had illegally tied the two products together in violation 
of EU competition law.187  Again, Vesterdorf expressed sympathy 
with Microsoft’s arguments that the packaging of Windows with 
the Media Player had not prevented PC manufacturers from selling 
a package that contained other media players and that buyers were 
also free to add other media players into their PC.188 
 
Concluding the lecture, Vesterdorf expressed concern about the 
“far reaching consequences” of the Microsoft decision.189  He ob-
served that the case expanded the power of the Commission and 
the national authorities in pursuing dominant firms, and this might 
have “negative consequences for holders of IPRs” by discouraging 
their incentives to innovate.190  In regards to the tying claim, he re-
minded readers that “overstretching the concept of tying can be-
come a serious constraint for what otherwise would be valuable 
development and innovation to the benefit of consumers.”191  
 
The Microsoft case offers a textbook example of how the collegi-
al decision-making process in fact suppresses dissent and creates 
the illusion of a single, unanimous decision.  Had the Microsoft case 
allowed dissent, it would have sent a signal to the Court of Justice 
that there was in fact fierce disagreement among the members of 
the panel.  However, the final decision was crafted as a strong en-
dorsement of the Commission’s decision exactly to avoid com-
municating any such signal to the higher court.    
 
6.  THE ASYMMETRIC JURISDICTION  
 
Judges derive power from judicial activity.  In the opinion of 
many serving at the Court, the success of the Court was built in its 
early days when it acted with “courage, foresight and imagination” 
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in “constitutionalizing” the Community.192  EU judges are nostalgic 
about the Court’s “glorious past,” as evidenced by the proliferation 
of their celebration of the Court’s achievements in law journals and 
magazines.193  But their exercise of judicial power faces an im-
portant constraint:  the jurisdictional competence of the Court.  
Due to its hierarchical structure and the implicit hierarchy among 
different cases, the division of labor between the General Court 
and the Court of Justice could lead to divergent incentives for 
judges working at different levels of the Court.  
 
6.1.  The Aversion to Appeals 
 
At the Court of Justice, a large bulk of the work is handling 
preliminary references, which are questions referred from the na-
tional courts of the EU Member States.  As shown in Table 5 below, 
49% of cases handled by the Court of Justice from 2005 to 2014 are 
preliminary reference.  In preliminary reference proceedings, the 
role of the Court is to give the ultimate interpretation of EU law 
and ensure uniformity in its application.194  Many political scien-
tists have attributed the Court’s success to the preliminary refer-
ence proceedings.  By engaging with individual litigants and na-
tional courts, preliminary references were the main mechanism 
through which the Court could expand the EU legal order and ad-
vance the goal of European integration.195  Preliminary reference is 
                                                     
192 See Giuseppe Federico Mancini & David T. Keeling, Democracy and the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice, 57 MOD. L. REV. 175, 182 (1994) (noting the Court’s achieve-
ments despite the inherent and built-in weaknesses of the procedure).  
193 See Harm Schepel & Rein Wesseling, The Legal Community: Judges, Lawyers, 
Officials and Clerks in the Writing of Europe, 3 EUR. L. J. 165, 178–79 (1997) (arguing 
that the structure and community of EU lawyers played a significant impact in the 
development of the law). 
194 See Edward, supra note 18, at 544–45 (describing the courts’ role in refer-
ences to determine the nature of EU law that national courts will apply and that 
will be applicable throughout the European Community). 
195 See Walter Mattli & Ann-Marie Slaughter, Revisiting the European Court of 
Justice, 52 Int’l Org. 177, 200 (1998) (finding that national courts were relatively 
accepting of the direct effect and supremacy of EU law).  See also Karen J. Alter, 
Who are the “Masters of the Treaty”?: European Governments and the European Court of 
Justice, 52 INT’L ORG. 121, 126 (1998) (showing that the ECJ intentionally encour-
ages national courts to set aside incompatible national policies by using the pre-
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therefore regarded as “the jewel in the crown” in the jurisdictional 
competence of the Court of Justice,196 and many, if not most, of the 
Court’s most audacious and groundbreaking decisions are prelim-
inary rulings.  As revealed in Table 5 below, during the period 
from 2005 to 2014, 60% of the cases handled by the grand chamber 
and the full court were preliminary reference proceedings, a higher 
percentage than the portion (49%) among all cases.  This suggests 
that, in general, a preliminary reference carries more weight than 
other types of proceedings.   
 
 
Table 5:  Preliminary Reference v. Appeals by Court of Justice 
(2005-2014)197  
 
All Cases Grand Chambers and Full 
Court cases 
Appeals Preliminary  
Reference 
Appeals Preliminary  
Reference 
19% 49% 14% 60% 
 
In comparison, appeals follow a form of adversarial procedure 
where the Court only rules on the questions and issues the parties 
have decided to litigate.198  Because an appeal is a lawsuit against a 
jurisdictional act—i.e., the judgment of the General Court—its pro-
cedure is subject to many constraints and must be handled with 
great caution and precision.  Moreover, appeals are much more ef-
fort-intensive compared with preliminary references and are gen-
erally very time-consuming.199  The Court has to meticulously ex-
amine the judgment of the General Court and to thoroughly 
review the various written submissions in order to determine 
whether the lower court ignored any pleas from the parties.  In 
                                                                                                                        
liminary ruling mechanism (Article 177) to indicate in its decisions whether or not 
certain types of national law would be in compliance with EC law).  
196 PAUL CRAIG, EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 263 (2d ed., 2012). 
197 This data is hand-collected using the Court’s database.  InfoCuria, supra 
note 31. 
198 Edward, supra note 18, at 543. 
199 Telephone Interview with Former Référendaire (April 29, 2015) (notes on 
file with Author); Interview with Former Référendaire, in London, Eng. (Feb. 19, 
2015) (notes on file with Author).  
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contrast, during preliminary reference proceedings the Court of 
Justice is required only to interpret the law; it does not step into the 
shoes of the national court to rule on the merits of the case.  While 
appeals demand higher efforts than preliminary reference proceed-
ings, they carry less weight and play a less central role in enhanc-
ing the authority and legitimacy of the Court.  As shown in Table 
5, only 14% of grand chamber and full court decisions are appeals, 
a lower percentage than the portion (19%) among all cases.  This 
shows that, in general, appeals carry less weight than other types 
of proceedings, particularly compared to preliminary reference 
proceedings.   
 
Meanwhile, the vast majority of the competition cases handled 
by the Court of Justice are appeals—see Table 6 below.  Compared 
with other cases the Court handles, competition appeals have low-
er visibility and rarely capture media attention.  From 2005 to 2014, 
over 52%200 of all competition law appeals concerned the calcula-
tion of fines in cartel cases.  For those yearning for power, the cal-
culation of cartel fines is probably among the least exciting cases 
that will push the frontiers of EU law.  Indeed, in these cases, the 
parties usually admitted their wrong-doing and only contested the 
Commission’s calculation of fines.  At the same time, these cases 
are also very effort-intensive.  As a consequence, there is an aver-
sion among members and staff at the higher court in handling such 
appeals.201  As members and staff of the Court of Justice do not 
want their dockets flooded with appeals from the General Court, 
they are likely to be less inclined to annul the Commission’s deci-
sions.  The situation is different when it comes to preliminary ref-
erence proceedings, which generally concern novel and difficult 
questions that the national courts were not able to resolve.  In those 
occasions, judges and référendaires have the freedom to reformu-
late the questions they would seek to answer.  An insider suggests 
that this explains why the Court appears much more receptive to 
economic analysis and provides more reasoned analysis when 
                                                     
200 This data is hand-collected using the Court’s database.  InfoCuria, supra 
note 31. 
201 Telephone Interview with Former Référendaire (April 29, 2015) (notes on 
file with Author); Interview with Former Référendaire, in London, Eng. (Feb. 19, 
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dealing with competition law cases in preliminary reference pro-
ceedings than in appeals.202 
 
Table 6:  Competition Cases Decided by the Court of Justice 
(2005 to 2014)203  
 
All Competition Cases Grand Chambers and Full 
Court Competition Cases 
    Appeals Preliminary  
Reference 
    Appeals Preliminary  
Reference 
74% 24% 73% 27% 
 
6.2.  The Dilemma of the Lower Court  
 
Compared with the Court of Justice, the General Court is more 
specialized and has a narrower scope of jurisdiction.  The General 
Court was set up in 1989 to reduce the workload of the Court of 
Justice in dealing with competition and staff cases and to search 
more deeply into case facts.204  While the jurisdictional scope of the 
General Court has expanded over the years, it has not dealt with 
preliminary reference cases.205  Unlike the situation at the higher 
court, competition occupies a more central role among its case 
                                                     
202 Interview with Former Référendaire, in London, Eng. (Feb. 19, 2015) 
(notes on file with Author).    
203 This data is hand-collected using the Court’s database.  InfoCuria, supra 
note 31. 
204 Memorandum by the CBI to the U.K. House of Lords, in HOUSE OF LORDS, 
EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, JUSTICE AND INSTITUTIONS SUB-COMMITTEE, INQUIRY 
INTO THE WORKLOAD OF THE WORKLOAD OF THE EUROPEAN UNION WRITTEN 
EVIDENCE 7, 10 (2010), https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-
committees/eu-sub-com-e/CourtofJustice/euewrittenevidence.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SB9M-XGHL] (U.K.).  See also Council Decision 88/591/ECSC, 
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O.J. (L 319) 1, 1 (establishing the General Court). 
205 The Nice Treaty expressly provides for the possible transfer of certain pre-
liminary ruling cases to the General Court, leaving its implementation to the dis-
cretion of the Court of Justice.  See Nicolas Forwood, The Court of First Instance, Its 
Development, and Future Role in Legal Architecture of the European Union, in 
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN EU LAW: ARTICLES IN HONOR OF SIR FRANCIS JACOB 34, 
40 (Anthony Arnull et al. eds., 2008) (“[T]he Treaty provided expressly, for the 
first time, for the possible transfer to the CFI of competence in certain preliminary 
cases, such a transfer again being limited to ‘specific areas’ of Community law”).  
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portfolio.  As Judge Forwood once put it:  “for some Judges of the 
CFI [now the General Court] at least, [competition] has been their 
primary raison d'être.”206 
 
This has to do with the jurisdictional scope of the General 
Court, which generally deals with fact-intensive cases that are 
largely standard and routine.  Therefore, competition cases are 
generally regarded as “more interesting and visible” compared to 
other categories of cases.207  It also has to do with the Court's hu-
man capital.  The General Court is an attractive workplace for 
judges and référendaires with a competition law background, as it 
handles many more competition cases than the higher court.  In-
terviewees indicate that judges and référendaires who are interest-
ed in competition law tend to be more engaged with economic 
analysis and in-depth scrutiny of the Commission’s assessment.208  
However, because the General Court is bound by the rulings of the 
Court of Justice, it operates within a tight straightjacket.  While in 
principle the General Court does not need to adhere to the rulings 
by the Court of Justice, in practice there is pressure on it to do so 
because its decisions could be subject to appeal.209  Moreover, the 
General Court frequently refers to the judgments of the Court of 
Justice as a basis for its reasoning, thus reinforcing its subordina-
tion to the higher court.210  In fact, were the General Court to devi-
ate from the higher court’s ruling, it would undermine the authori-
ty of the Court of Justice before the national courts. 
Not surprisingly, when some judges at the General Court at-
tempted to conduct more intense scrutiny of the Commission’s 
economic analysis, the Court of Justice reminded it that it lacks the 
power to do so.211  As explained by Mark Jaeger, the President of 
                                                     
206 Id. at 44.  
207 Telephone Interview with Former Référendaire (April 29, 2015) (notes on 
file with Author). 
208 Id.  
209 Takis Tridimas, Precedent and the Court of Justice: A Jurisprudence of Doubt?, 
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 307, 307 n.4 (Julie Dick-
son & Pavlos Eleftheriadis eds., 2012); Marc van der Woude, The Court of First In-
stance, the First Three Years, 16 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 412, 459–60 (1992) (stating that 
the possibility of appeal renders the CFI practically deferential to ECJ decisions). 
210 Woude, supra note 209, at 459. 
211 Mark Jaeger, The Standard of Review in Competition Cases Involving Complex 
  
126 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:1 
 
the General Court, when defending the General Court’s “deferen-
tial approach . . . [, i]f the General Court’s message as to its will-
ingness to review the Commission’s assessments of complex eco-
nomic matters through an intense—though marginal—review 
seems to be clear, the intervention of the Court of Justice may, 
however, confuse the issue in the eyes of interested observers.”212  
He then went on to note three instances in which the General Court 
attempted to apply more intense scrutiny to the Commission’s 
economic analysis.213  For instance, in Impala, decided in 2006, the 
General Court criticized the Commission for its failure to verify the 
accuracy and relevance of the data submitted by the parties, espe-
cially in light of the fact that the data contradicted the information 
the Commission gathered during its market investigation.214  In 
GlaxoSmithKlein, the General Court abandoned the per se approach 
in analyzing vertical restraint cases and conducted a deeper as-
sessment of the economic effects of the agreement in question.215  
In Alrosa, the General Court conducted close scrutiny of the vari-
ous commitments offered by the parties to settle their case with the 
Commission and annulled the Commission’s decision for in-
fringement of the principle of proportionality.216 
 
All these attempts, however, failed, and in each case the Gen-
eral Court was scolded by the Court of Justice for overstepping the 
confined boundary of a marginal review of the Commission’s 
“complex economic assessment.”217  As a result, the General Court 
needs to tread a very fine line between (in the words of Judge Jae-
ger):  “intense control of all elements on which the Commission re-
lied leading to its appraisal—especially those expressed in the 
judgment of the General Court and . . . recognition of a certain dis-
cretion on the part of the Commission in recalling that marginal 
review prevents judges substituting their own appreciation to the 
decision-makers—as brought out in some recent judgments by the 
                                                                                                                        
Economic Assessment: Towards the Marginalisation of the Marginal Review, 2 J. EUR. 
COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 295, 303–05 (2011).  
212 Id. at 303. 
213 Id. at 303–05. 
214  Id. at 303. 
215 Id. at 303–04. 
216 Id. at 304. 
217 Id. 
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Court of Justice.”218  The Court of Justice, on the other hand, is in a 
position to innovate and overrule those outdated precedents.  But 
many judges and référendaires there lack the incentives to do so 
due to their aversion to competition law appeals.  As a conse-
quence, lowering the intensity of judicial oversight in these cases 
could be an indirect way to limit competition appeals.219  This 
unique institutional design of the Court therefore leads to a very 
unfortunate outcome:  those who want to innovate lack the power 
to do so, whereas those with the power lack the incentive. 
 
7.  CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Political scientists and legal scholars who study the Court tend 
to view it as a unitary entity.220  They build their study upon an as-
sumption that the Court has a single, coherent objective to achieve 
the political goal of integrating Europe.  Instead of viewing the 
Court as a whole, this Article considers the individuals who com-
prise it.  It examines the selection process, career structures and in-
centives of the EU judges and their référendaires, as well as the 
Court’s decision-making process, and investigates how these can 
influence judicial behavior.  It has several major findings.  
 
First, the Article finds that the Court's high judicial salaries and 
lack of procedural safeguards for EU judicial appointments attract 
political appointees.  As a consequence, some judges who are se-
lected are not competent to perform their duties and are dominat-
ed by their référendaires.  Moreover, the uncertainty inherent to 
judicial re-appointment and the high turnover rate of EU judges 
hampers their productivity, and increases their dependence on the 
référendaires.  Meanwhile, référendaires are drawn from a relative-
                                                     
218 Id. at 305. 
219 Craig observed that this technique of limiting caseload has also been ap-
plied to preliminary reference proceedings.  See Craig, supra note 196, at 267 (dis-
cussing the technique of indirectly limiting case load by limiting the intensity of 
judicial oversight).  
220 See generally ALTER supra note 2 (describing the Court’s political influence 
as a collective unit); ALEC STONE SWEET, THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 
(2004) (analyzing the many roles the European Court has played, but considering 
it a single unit in its role).  
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ly closed social network due to the lack of an open platform for re-
cruitment and the requirement of French as the working language.  
The inefficiency of the référendaire labor market results in less 
competition, leading many référendaires to stay longer at the 
Court.  The longevity of career référendaires also gives them tre-
mendous power; some of these référendaires become conservative 
forces that resist changes and reform.  The revolving door between 
the Court and the Commission raises serious conflict issues, as the 
Commission was able to exert influence on the Court from the in-
side and gain a comparative advantage in litigation.  Moreover, the 
Court’s practice of issuing a single, collegial decision encourages 
free-riding and increases pressures for judges and référendaires to 
conform and suppresses dissent, as illustrated in the Microsoft case.  
Last but not least, the division of labor between the lower court 
and the higher court creates divergent incentive structures for 
judges and référendaires working at different levels.  
 
Achieving a sound understanding of the Court is key to legal 
reform.  The current EU proposal to reform the Court, which fo-
cuses primarily on increasing the number of judges in order to re-
duce backlog,221 misses the bigger picture.  This Article points to 
three critical aspects in need of reform.  
 
First, instead of continuing the current fragmented approach to 
nominating EU judges, the EU needs a unified policy for judicial 
appointment.  The Committee established under Article 255 TFEU 
is a promising step, but its power is limited and is inadequate to 
address concerns over judicial quality.  Meanwhile, more careful 
consideration should be given to the optimal structure of judicial 
careers (e.g., compensation, tenure, exit options), which directly in-
fluences selection into the judiciary and the behavior of judges.  
For instance, overpaying judges could increase the risks of political 
interference during appointment.  Moreover, the six-year term for 
EU judges is too short and severely reduces their productivity.  A 
longer, non-renewable tenure, would increase judge productivity 
                                                     
221 See Press Release of the Council of the European Union, Q&A on the Re-
form of the General Court (June 23, 2015), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
en/press/press-releases/2015/06/23-questions-answers-general-court/ 
[https://perma.cc/XKG3-P8GL] (stating that the General Court will double its 
number of judges in a few years).  
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while allowing greater independence.  Judges would then have the 
freedom to dissent, which would provide them with the necessary 
incentives to exert effort to improve the quality of opinions.   
 
Second, the Court should reconsider the use of the French lan-
guage as a working language.  One oft-cited reason to preserve the 
French language is to reduce administrative cost.222  But this argu-
ment overlooks the impact of the French language on judicial deci-
sion-makers.  The difficulty of the French language has prohibited 
many EU countries from finding suitable candidates to serve at the 
Court.  Equally important, but often ignored, is that French also ar-
tificially reduces the size of the labor market for référendaires, re-
sulting in an outcome wherein Francophones have a dispropor-
tionate influence on shaping EU law.  English is the obvious 
alternative.  As a foreign language English is much more widely 
spoken than French in Europe223 and it has functioned well as the 
official language in other EU institutions such as the Commission.   
 
The recruitment, management, and governance of référen-
daires should command more attention from EU policymakers.  
Establishing an official online platform for recruiting référendaires 
will increase the efficiency for both the application and hiring pro-
cesses.  In addition, an adequate mechanism should be created to 
address any potential concern of a revolving door between the 
Court and other public and private institutions.  The secondment 
program from the Commission to the Court raises serious conflict 
issues, and it is questionable whether such a scheme should be al-
lowed to continue.  Considering that many référendaires serve 
longer than their judges, it is well worth considering whether the 
tenure of référendaires should be capped, as otherwise they risk 
exerting a powerful conservative force upon the Court and domi-
nating less experienced judges.  
 
 
                                                     
222 See Schiemann, supra note 84, at 10–11 (noting the difficulty in finding 
English-speaking supporting staff to serve at the Court, especially considering the 
Court is located in a French-speaking country).  
223 See Eur. Comm’n, supra note 83, at 5 (showing English is the most widely 
spoken language in the EU (38%) and far exceeding French (12%)). 
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Appendix I  Background Information of Judges and  
Advocates General 
 




Total GC Judge 
CJ 
Judge AG 
Count 184 66 95 45 
Gender (M=1, F = 0) 0.892 0.831 0.917 0.911 
Current Member 0.346 0.508 0.302 0.244 
Complete Education Infor-
mation  
0.227 0.277 0.188 0.178 
Education (PHD 1, non-PHD 0) 0.416 0.385 0.469 0.311 
Previous 
Experience  
Academia 0.619 0.600 0.630 0.733 
Private  
Practice 
0.335 0.415 0.313 0.333 
Référendaire  at 
the Court 
0.108 0.182 0.052 0.111 
CJEU 0.135 0.000 0.063 0.133 
National Court 0.535 0.508 0.552 0.467 
National  
Government 
0.654 0.569 0.667 0.756 
European  
Commission 





Government 0.281 0.215 0.292 0.289 
Academia 0.276 0.262 0.313 0.244 
Judiciary 0.173 0.231 0.156 0.089 
Private Practice 0.108 0.123 0.094 0.067 
Unknown 0.162 0.169 0.146 0.311 
Last Posi-
tion  
Government 0.270 0.262 0.271 0.222 
Academia 0.189 0.154 0.240 0.178 
Judiciary 0.286 0.292 0.281 0.222 
Private Practice 0.070 0.138 0.021 0.089 
Unknown 0.184 0.154 0.188 0.289 
 
  





1. This table provides the summary statistics of the background 
information of current and former judges and advocates general 
(both referred to as EU judges) at the General Court and the 
Court of Justice.  It does not provide information on the judges at 
the Civil Service Tribunal (CST).  The information was coded 
from the court’s website.224  
 
2. “Count” indicates the number of valid data points. 
 
3. GC=General Court; CJ=Court of Justice; AG=Advocate Gen-
eral; Court = GC+CJ; “CJEU” =GC+CJ+CST. 
    
4. “Complete education experience” means that the schools and 
the degrees received by the EU judge are both specified in his 
public profile.  
 
5. “Previous experience” refers to an EU judge's prior working 
experience before joining the Court.  The vast majority of EU 
judges have varied experience. 
  
6. “Primary prior work experience” refers to the longest job expe-
rience of an EU judge prior to joining the Court.  For instance, if a 
judge worked for ten years as a judge at a national court and five 
years as an academic prior to joining the Court, his primary prior 
work experience is judiciary. 
  
7. “Last position” refers to the last position immediately before 




                                                     
224 InfoCuria, Court of Justice, CURIA, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/
jcms/p1_217426/en/ [https://perma.cc/BX29-LXFU] (last visited Oct. 15, 2016); 
InfoCuria, General Court, CURIA, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/p1_217427/
en/ [https://perma.cc/X8AS-VD5S] (last visited Oct. 15, 2016); InfoCuria, Presen-
tation of the Members, CURIA, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7026/en/ 
[https://perma.cc/3P6C-SG2Z] (last visited Oct. 15, 2016). 
  







Tenure of Former Judges and Advocates  
General (in years) 
GC Judge CJ Judge AG 
Average 8.243 8.985 7.278 
Median 7 8 6 
Std Dev 4.136 4.310 4.286 
Min 2 0 2 
Max 18 21 20 
Notes: 
 
1. This table provides the summary statistics of the tenure of the 
former EU judges at the General Court and the Court of Justice. 
The information was coded from the court’s website.225  
 




                                                     
225 InfoCuria, Court of Justice, CURIA, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/
jcms/p1_217426/en/ [https://perma.cc/BX29-LXFU] (last visited Oct. 15, 2016); 
InfoCuria, General Court, CURIA, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/p1_217427/
en/ [https://perma.cc/X8AS-VD5S] (last visited Oct. 15, 2016); InfoCuria, Presen-
tation of the Members, CURIA, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7026/en/ 
[https://perma.cc/3P6C-SG2Z] (last visited Oct. 15, 2016). 
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Appendix III        Basic Background Information of a Sample of 
Current and Former Référendaires. 226 
  
                                                     
226 Supra note 89–90 and accompanying text. 
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Appendix IV        Tenure and Work Experience of a Sample of 
Current and Former Référendaires.227 
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Appendix V        The Revolving Door Between the Commission 
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